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Abstract
My thesis consists of three essays on International Economics. In the first two chapters, I study
the role of domestic markets on the issuance of sovereign debt. In the third chapter, I evaluate
the aggregate consequences of large devaluations on exporting dynamics.
Chapter 2 studies the episodes of sovereign default triggering banking crises. First, those
episodes are characterized by an important exposure of domestic banks to government bonds.
Therefore, a default triggers a credit crunch in the economy. Second, output and investment
show a considerable drop and a protracted recovery after the default. In this chapter, I focus
on the channel in which a default affects the capital accumulation financed by banks. I build
a quantitative model to assess whether this channel can account for the joint dynamics of out-
put and investment during empirical episodes where a default preceded a banking crisis. The
model is calibrated to reproduce the empirical moments of banks’ bondholding exposure and
capital accumulation ex-ante to default in those economies that experienced a joint default and
banking crisis. The model reproduces the untargeted dynamics of macroeconomic and finan-
cial variables during a default. Finally, I use the model to evaluate the ex-ante trade-off when
a government issue government debt to banks. By issuing more debt, they decrease the in-
centives to default but it crowds-out capital accumulation in the economy. Also, I show that
the crowding-out effect is lower for economies with a banking system that has more access to
deposits.
Chapter 3 analyzes the trade-offs that a government faces when deciding whether to is-
sue debt through domestic and foreign markets under limited commitment. I find empirical
evidence showing a negative correlation between the exposure of domestic banks to govern-
ment bondholdings with the interest rate spread compensating for the risk of default. In order
to rationalize this fact, I develop a quantitative model where government chooses the optimal
amount of debt issued to international investors and domestic banks and cannot discriminate
across investors. The stock of debt held by foreign investor’s vis-a-vis the stock held by banks is
meaningful to determine default incentives. While a repudiation of debt decreases the amount
that should be paid by foreign lenders, the default is costly for domestic private intermediation.
As a result, bond price worsens with the increase of foreign debt, while it improves with do-
mestic debt. I parametrize the model the resemble the banking sector exposure to government
bonds and default frequency of an emerging economy. The model is close to reproduce the
untargeted share of domestic to foreign debt observed in the data.
i
Chapter 4 studies the macroeconomic effects of large and persistent devaluations. In the
data we observe that after a large devaluation, exports have a sluggish reaction and start to
increase after several years. I show that this pattern characterizes the devaluation observed in
real exchange rate of Colombia in 2014. I build a quantitative model of a small open economy
featuring costs for incumbent and new exporters. A share of the cost is paid by importing
goods from the rest of the world. Therefore, in this stylize model, I introduce the feature that
exporters are also intensive importers. This resembles a feature of the Colombian data where
firms that account for 90 % of the exports are also intensive importers. Both elements affects
the dynamics of the extensive margin for exporters. I solve the model and reproduce a large
devaluation event that matches the dynamics observed in the data for real exchange rate and
interest rates. I show that the model is able reproduce the sluggish reaction of net exports.
The model is calibrated to match the steady state of several moments of the Colombian
economy for the period of 1980-2012. In particular, I calibrate the parameters dominating
probability distribution of the continuation and sunk costs to match the continuing rate of ex-
porters and the exit rate. I solve the model using local projection methods. I use the solution of
the model to find the optimal path of shocks to resemble a RER devaluation and the increase in
international interest rate. I show that the model is able to match the dynamics of the elasticity
of exports to RER.
ii
Summary for the Lay Audience
My thesis consists of three essays on International Economics related to sovereign default and
banking crises, domestic debt, and large devaluations.
Chapter 2 studies the episodes of sovereign default triggering banking crises. Those episodes
are characterized by an important exposure of domestic banks to government bonds. There-
fore, a default triggers a credit crunch in the economy. I focus on the channel in which a
default affects the capital accumulation financed by banks. I build a quantitative model to as-
sess whether this channel can account for the joint dynamics of output and investment during
empirical episodes where a default preceded a banking crisis. I use the model to evaluate the
ex-ante trade-off when a government issue government debt to banks. By issuing more debt,
they decrease the incentives to default but it crowds-out capital accumulation in the economy.
Chapter 3 analyzes the trade-offs that a government faces when deciding whether to is-
sue debt through domestic and foreign markets under limited commitment. I find empirical
evidence showing a negative correlation between the exposure of domestic banks to govern-
ment bondholdings with the interest rate spread compensating for the risk of default. In order
to rationalize this fact, I develop a quantitative model where government chooses the optimal
amount of debt issued to international investors and domestic banks and cannot discriminate
across investors. The model is close to reproduce the untargeted share of domestic to foreign
debt observed in the data.
Chapter 4 studies the macroeconomic effects of large and persistent devaluations. In the
data we observe that after a large devaluation, exports have a sluggish reaction and start to
increase after several years. I build a quantitative model of a small open economy featuring
costs for incumbent and new exporters to rationalize this fact. In the model, sunk costs affect the
decisions of exporters to participate in international markets. Therefore, those costs represents
a friction for participation. I solve and simulate the model to replicate the sluggish reaction
of the elasticity of exports with respect to the real exchange rate.tions. In the data we observe
that after a large devaluation, exports have a sluggish reaction and start to increase after several
years. I build a quantitative model of a small open economy featuring costs for incumbent
and new exporters to rationalize this fact. In the model, sunk costs affect the decisions of
exporters to participate in international markets. Therefore, those costs represents a friction for
participation. I solve and simulate the model to replicate the sluggish reaction of the elasticity
of exports with respect to the real exchange rate.
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My thesis consists of three chapters related to topics in international economics. In the first
chapter, I study the importance of the credit–investment channel to explain the aggregate con-
sequences of a sovereign default that triggers a banking crisis. The second chapter also focuses
on the sovereign-bank nexus. In particular, I study the role of debt held by domestic banks in
public debt sustainability. The last chapter explores the effects of entry costs for new exporters
to explain the sluggish reaction of exports to real exchange rate (RER) devaluation.
Sovereign defaults that lead to banking crises are distinguished by a deep drop in output
and protracted recovery. In these events, most public debt is issued through domestic markets,
while a significant share of domestic banks’ assets are government bonds. This paper studies
how the exposure of the banking system to government debt accounts for the dynamics of in-
vestment and output during a default followed by a contraction in domestic credit. I develop
a quantitative model that features capital accumulation, financial intermediation, and endoge-
nous sovereign default. According to the model, banks invest in capital and buy bonds issued
by a benevolent government, and they are financially constrained to issue deposits based on
the value of their net worth. During sovereign default, a bank’s investment in capital drops
as its net worth decreases. I calibrate the model to match the fraction of bank assets held as
government bonds, the mean investment to gross domestic product (GDP), and the investment
volatility of economies that experience distress in domestic credit after a default. The model
is able to reproduce the untargeted observed dynamics of output, investment, consumption,
deposits, and bank assets around default events.
In Chapter 2, I also use the model to illustrate the trade-off that government debt held in
the banking sector provides between the ex-ante incentives to default and the ex-post cost of
default. An increase of 50% in the share of bonds among banks’ assets decreases the probabil-
1
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
ity of default but increases the volatility of investment to GDP by 23% and reduces the level
of investment to GDP by 18%. With a lower capital stock, the ability to insure the economy
against productivity shocks lessens, and the volatility of consumption relative to GDP increases
by 13%. I demonstrate that, based on the data, the disruption in capital accumulation is reduced
in economies with higher access to domestic deposits. In the model, economies with greater
ability to issue deposits have more resources to lessen the crowding-out effect of sovereign debt
in bank balance sheets.
In Chapter 3, I continue studying the sovereign-bank nexus. However, I here focus on the
role domestic debt issuance plays in public debt sustainability. In particular, I study an envi-
ronment in which the government is not able to discriminate across bondholders, meaning it
is costly to default to foreign investors, as this also affects domestic banks. By issuing more
domestic debt, a government increases its incentives to repay and improve its borrowing condi-
tions. I study whether this channel can explain the structure of domestic to foreign debt issued
by governments. I also develop a model of sovereign default that incorporates both domestic
banks and foreign investors. The model is calibrated to simulate the default rate and the av-
erage bondholding exposure of the banking system for an emerging economy. I show that the
model can simultaneously replicate the untargeted structure of foreign to domestic debt as well
as several business cycle statistics.
I also provide a rationale for the negative empirical correlation between the sovereign
spread and the stock of domestic debt held by different countries. In the model, the variation in
the bondholding exposure of the banking system allows to replicate this negative relationship.
A government with higher bondholding exposure has lower incentives to default, as this can
trigger a credit crunch in the economy. First, the sovereign spread decreases with the lower
willingness to default. Second, the government issues more domestic debt, as it can in this way
strategically improve the cost of foreign borrowing. I go on to document evidence showing that
domestic banks’ balance sheets are highly exposed to local government bonds. On average, a
domestic bank maintains around 12% of its balance sheet as sovereign debt and holds 25% of
the total stock of public debt. Given such exposure, it is estimated that, during sovereign de-
fault episodes, domestic credit decreases by 4% of GDP on average. In addition, I empirically
demonstrate that the risk of sovereign default implied from bond prices is negatively correlated
with the exposure of domestic banks’ balance sheets to local government bonds. A rationale
for the latter relationship is that investors consider that the willingness to default decreases with
the risk of triggering a decrease in credit intermediation.
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In Chapter 4, I study the importance of frictions to new exporters to explain the sluggish
dynamics of exports after a RER devaluation, focusing on the case of Colombia in 2014. At
that time, the RER was devaluated by 40%, and the exports showed an increase after several
quarters. I develop a quantitative model according to which sunk costs affects firms’ decisions
to become exporters. Exporters are also intensive importers, as they must finance a share of
their costs with external goods. The reaction of exports to a devaluation may be dampened
for two reasons. First, sunk costs reduce the willingness of firms to operate abroad. Second,
as exporters are intensive importers, their costs increase substantially upon a devaluation. The
model is calibrated to match the steady state of several moments of the Colombian economy
for the period of 1980–2012. I solve the model using local projection methods and use the
solution to determine the optimal shock path to represent an RER devaluation and the resulting
increase in the international interest rate. I show that the model is able to match the dynamics
of the elasticity of exports to RER.
Chapter 2
Domestic Debt, Financial Intermediaries,
and the Dynamics of Investment
2.1 Introduction
Recent empirical studies have documented particular regularities in default events that precede
an episode of domestic credit distress.1 First, they are distinguished by a severe and protracted
decline in GDP compared to defaults that do not lead to a credit crunch. Second, they lead to
a simultaneous drop in investments, deposits, and banks’ assets. Third, economies that experi-
enced such a default issued 85 % of their public debt in domestic markets. Fourth, following
these events, the share of a government’s bonds to assets that are held by domestic banks in-
creases substantially in the run-up to default.
In this paper, I quantitatively study the effect that a default on domestically-held debt has
on physical capital accumulation through assessing the impact on banks’ balance sheets. I
develop a closed economy model that incorporates both endogenous sovereign default and do-
mestic banks that simultaneously invest in bonds and physical capital. In the model, investment
is directly affected by the contraction in credit following a default. The model is calibrated to
simulate the effects on a set of economies that face a contraction in domestic credit after a
default. The model can replicate the untargeted boom, bust, and recovery dynamics around
default events. During the boom, the government increases its issuance of debt, which is ac-
quired by banks. In turn, this increase in debt raises the exposure of banks’ balance sheets in
the event of default. A sovereign default triggers a decrease in banks’ assets and new deposits.
Accordingly, during the bust, distressed banks reduce their investment in physical capital, and
1See Asonuma and Trebesch (2016), Balteanu and Erce (2018), and Asonuma et al. (2020).
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their consumption and output fall.
I also provide a framework that builds on a closed economy business cycle model with
financial intermediation and endogenous sovereign default. The model features banks that use
their own net worth, along with external funds from households’ deposits, to buy short-term
government bonds and to provide funding for firms. Bank loans are the only source of funding
for firms to buy capital goods. Banks are financially constrained to issue deposits due to an
agency problem between households and banks. Banks’ ability to issue deposits depends on
the level of their net worth, which can be used as collateral. Government bonds and loans to
firms make up the asset side of banks’ balance sheets.
In this setup, government debt issuance and repayment decisions affect banks’ lending for
capital goods via two channels. First, a banks’ net worth evolves as the returns of assets in-
vested in the previous period. A sovereign default depletes the returns to bondholdings and,
consequently, banks’ net worth. Provided that banks are constrained to issue deposits given the
value of their net worth, the number of external deposits is reduced. Hence, banks’ loans, which
are used for capital goods, contract after the default. Second, as the government issues more
debt, it crowds-out potential loans for firms. In particular, during episodes where the govern-
ment issues an important amount of debt, it can negatively affect physical capital accumulation.
In this economy, the government finances a constant level of expenditure by labor income
tax and issuing short-term debt. During each period, the government can either default or repay.
The government is benevolent and maximizes a household’s lifetime utility by considering the
effects of its bond issuance on capital accumulation and deposit holdings. However, it must
consider the cost of disrupting credit intermediation.
I use this model to study the disruption of capital accumulation in sovereign defaults that
are followed by domestic credit distress. I calibrated the model to reproduce the moments
related to capital accumulation, credit intermediation, and sovereign default. The model pre-
cisely reproduces targeted moments such as the observed investment–output ratio, output and
investment volatility, banks’ bondholdings as share of assets, the deposits–output ratio, and the
default rate. At the same time, the model correctly predicts a set of untargeted moments such
as debt to GDP (0.17 in the data vs 0.10 in the model) and correlations between consumption
and output (0.60 vs 0.98), investment and output (0.50 vs 0.38), and deposits and output (-0.01
vs 0.04).
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The model is able to capture the dynamics surrounding the boom and contractions in default
events that preceded distress in domestic credit. In the boom, output, consumption, investment,
and deposits grow at 2.7%, 2%, 7%, and 5%, respectively. The model is able to capture 99%,
84%, 87%, and 134% of the increase in output, consumption, investment, and deposits, from
three years to one year before the default. During the bust, the output, consumption, invest-
ment, and deposits fall by 4%, 3%, 12%, and 11%, respectively. The model accounts for 110%,
120%, 107%, and 87%, of the contraction in output, consumption, investment, and deposits,
respectively. In addition, the dynamics of the model resemble the recovery observed in the data
of around three years.
I show that the empirical evidence is consistent with the model’s prediction that invest-
ment drops heavily in defaults when a high share of domestic banks’ assets are government
bonds. I build a panel of countries with information of investment, banks’ bondholdings to as-
sets, and default events. I estimate a pooled regression of investment on default events, banks’
bondholdings to assets, country-fixed effects, and time-varying effects. I found that, during
a default, large drops in investment are associated with a high level of bondholdings held by
banks previous to this event. Therefore, this exercise provides evidence that a default affects
the credit-investment channel through the exposure of banks’ balance sheets to government
debt.
In this economy, capital is an important asset for consumption smoothing. By accumulat-
ing capital, the government increases its insurance against the total-factor productivity (TFP)
shocks. Hence, by issuing sovereign debt, the government disrupts the accumulation of an
asset that is useful to smooth consumption. I use the model to quantify how the ratio of the
volatilities of consumption and GDP changes due to the crowding-out of investment in capi-
tal. I recalibrated the model to match an increase of 50% in the share of bonds to assets. In
this case, the mean investment to capital decreased by 18 %, and the ratio of the volatilities
of investment and GDP increased by 23 %. As the economy maintains a lower and volatile
accumulation of capital, the consumption smoothing that the capital can provide decreases. In
fact, the ratio of the volatilities of consumption and GDP increased by 13 %. At the same time,
by introducing a higher ex-post cost of default, the probability of default decreased from 2.7
% to 1.01 %. Therefore, increasing the share of bonds in the economy can reduce the risk of
default at the cost of diminishing the ability to smooth consumption across TFP shocks.
Based on the sample of countries used to calibrate the model, I document that countries
with a high level of deposits to GDP maintain high levels of investment, a low ratio of volatil-
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ities of investment and GDP, and a low ratio of volatilities of consumption and GDP. I use the
model to explain this fact because it can reproduce this pattern. In the model, I varied the pa-
rameter of the financial friction, which represented the share of net worth used as collateral for
new deposits. By varying this parameter, I targeted the high and low levels of deposits to GDP.
The model shows that high levels of deposits allow for higher investment as there are more
resources to lessen the crowding-out effect of a bank’s bondholdings. Also, with high levels of
deposits, the ratio of volatilities of investment and GDP was lower in comparison to the cases
with low levels of deposits. Therefore, an economy with high levels of deposits accumulates
higher levels of capital, which is an asset that provides insurance against TFP shocks.
Finally, I use the model to show that the government benefits from a default by not increas-
ing the labor income tax rate at the level that would do in case of repayment. I simulated the
labor income tax in equilibrium around the default window. I quantify that after a default, the
labor income tax rate increases from 25 % to 30 %. Then, I simulated a counterfactual of the
labor income tax rate, which would be levied if the government repaid and kept issuing debt. In
this case, after a default, the tax rate increased from 25 % to 36 %. The reduced labor income
tax rate benefits the government as the labor income tax is distortionary.
Related Literature. This paper is related to a strand of literature that introduces sovereign
default decisions into real business cycle models. Gordon and Guerron-Quintana (2017) stud-
ied the quantitative properties of sovereign default models with capital accumulation in small
open economies. In their model, the government borrowed from international markets to in-
vest in capital as it offered insurance against TFP shocks. They showed that their model could
reproduce the cyclical properties of GDP and investment along with the business cycle prop-
erties of small, open economies. Park (2017) the role of capital accumulation in sovereign
defaults that take place in good times. The author showed that, in good times, the government
could borrow to overinvest in capital and then default. These decisions held as long as it had
enough capital to lessen the costs of default. In contrast with these models, I focus on a closed
economy where the resources for investment in capital comes from intermediary banks. In
my model, banks use households’ deposits and their accumulated net worth for investment in
capital goods. Additionally, in my model, the government crowds-out capital instead of being
a source for investment.
This paper builds on literature that has studied the effects of sovereign default on banks that
are important holders of governments’ debt. Sosa-Padilla (2018) examined the effect that Ar-
gentina’s default on domestic banks had on output and credit. In this model, banks buy bonds
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from the government and issue loans to finance working capital for labor. In a default, a bank’s
assets decrease, and, as a consequence, the credit for working capital drops. In a similar setup,
Pei (2016) allowed banks to provide loans for capital goods. This author assumed that default
only affected loans for working capital to hire labor. My work contrasts with theirs in two
ways. First, I focus on the effect that default has on capital accumulation through the credit
channel. Second, I focus on default events where deposits drop simultaneously with credit.
In my model, banks can issue deposits but are financially constrained by a share of their net
worth. In a default, as the net worth decreases, deposits drop and, as a consequence, credit
drops.
My paper contributes to growing literature that evaluates the importance of domestic finan-
cial frictions in the transmission of sovereign risk to the economy and, consequently, in the
government’s debt issuance decisions. Bocola (2016) introduced a model where financially
constrained banks accumulated domestic government debt and lent to firms. With a persistent
increase in exogenous sovereign risk, banks perceive that their funding conditions can be ex-
pected to become more constrained today and in the future; hence, they introduce a premium in
firms’ lending rates. In turn, the increase in the cost of credit leads to a decrease in investment
decisions. Gonzalez-Aguado (2019) studied the sovereign debt composition of external and
domestic debt with a government that could discriminate and default selectively across domes-
tic and foreign holders. In this study, the domestic holders are financially constrained banks
that intermediate resources from households to firms. The aforementioned author showed that
economies with higher financial developments tilted their portfolio compositions of debt to do-
mestic banks. I contribute to this literature by showing that a quantitative model with financial
frictions and a default in domestic debt is able to reproduce the joint dynamics of macroeco-
nomic and banking variables around default events that are followed by a contraction in credit.
Layout This chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, I present the model and the
equilibrium of the economy. In section 3, I discuss the parametrization of the model and
numerical solution that enable the reproduction of several features of the data. In section 4, I
present the quantitative results of the model, and in section 5, I discuss concluding remarks.
2.2 Model
This section outlines a closed economy populated by households, firms, and a benevolent gov-
ernment. I introduce a financial sector which is modeled as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). I
follow Bocola (2016) and include a government bond which is bought by financial intermedi-
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aries. In every state, the government can decide whether to repay or default. Therefore, this
asset can provide a return unless the government decides to default.
In this economy, each household has two agents workers and bankers. Workers supply la-
bor to a final good producer. Bankers issue deposits to households and invest in capital and
bonds. Firms transform loans into capital and repay the returns. The government has a constant
expenditure which is financed with labor income tax and by issuing sovereign debt.
The aggregate state of the economy at the beginning of the period incorporates endogenous
and exogenous state variables. The endogenous states are the domestic bondholdings b, the
capital in the economy k, and deposits d. The exogenous state variable incorporates the pro-
ductivity shock z.
In the remainder of this section, I describe the sequential problem for each agent and the
recursive competitive equilibrium. In the appendix, I discuss the numerical strategy for the
solution of the model.
2.2.1 Households
There is a continuum of identical households. Each household has a fraction of workers f
and a fraction of bankers, 1 − f with consumption insurance among both types. A household
values consumption c and dislikes labor l according to utility u(c, l) and discounts the future
at the rate β. Also, the household is able to save through deposits issued by banks. Labor is
supplied to a final good firm in exchange of wage rate w. Savings d earn a risk-free return
r and are managed by bankers from other households. I denote by π the net dividends that
the household receives from its shares on financial intermediaries, by π and by τ the labor
the income tax. I let the households to be the owners of the firms, each period they have to
face a cost in order to endow the firm with capital provided by banks, this cost is defined by
Φ(kt+1, kt). Households make plans for consumption, labor supply, and deposits in order to











= dt + (1 − τt)wtlt + πt + Φ(kt+1, kt).
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2.2.2 Financial intermediaries: bankers
Each period the composition of bankers varies as follows. Once the returns of the previous
period are realized, bankers use those returns and pay back households’ deposits. Next, each
banker observes with probability 1 − ψ a random variable indicating that he exits as a financial
intermediary. A banker is replaced by a worker and receives initial net worth n̄ to start to oper-
ate. At the same time, a banker that exits becomes a worker.2
Bankers work as financial intermediaries and lend funds to final good firms. Every period,
bankers buy government bonds bt+1 at price qt+1 and issue loans to firm kt+1 which involve a
return Rt+1 in the next period. They fund these assets with deposits dt, their own net worth nt
and pay dividends πbt to households. Bankers net profits π = ψπ
b
t − (1 − ψ)n̄ are the sum of
its dividends and the starting net worth received by a new banker. The banker balance sheet is
represented as follows:
qtbt+1 + kt+1 =
dt+1
rt
+ nt − πbt
In this setup, I assume that bankers cannot issue deposits beyond a share of their own capital,
that is:
dt+1 = λnt
where λ is the share of net worth that can be used as collateral to issue new deposits. The net
worth of bankers that do not exit evolves as:
nt+1 = bt+1 + Rt+1kt+1 − dt+1.
At time t the banker problem involves choosing bonds, loans to firms, deposits, and divi-
dends such that it maximizes the expected discounted flow of wealth that will arise if it remains
as banker considering the evolution of its net worth, the constraint to issue deposits, and the
2These assumptions prevents the banker to over accumulate wealth and do not need external funding.
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i−t{(1 − ψ)ni+1 + ψπbi+1}
s.t.
qi+1bi+1 + ki+1 =
di+1
ri
+ ni − πbi
di+1 = λni
ni+1 = bi+1 + Ri+1ki+1 − di+1





Firms face a technology shock zt which follows the process
zt+1 = (1 − ρ) + ρzt + εt+1 εt+1 ∼ N(0, 1).
Firms produce final goods by hiring capital kt and labor services lt from technology yt =
ztF(kt, lt). Labor services are hired each period when production takes place. Firms possess a
one-to-one technology to convert loans into capital goods that can be used in the production of
next period. Capital depreciates at rate δ ∈ (0, 1) after is used for production. The firm repay
for loans that are used Therefore, the problem of the firms becomes
maxkt ,ltztF(kt, lt) + (1 − δ)kt − Rtkt − wtlt
2.2.4 Government
Each period, a government face a constraint
g + bt = qtbt+1 + τtwtlt
where it has to finance an amount of debt g and the current stock of debt bt with the income
from taxing labor supply τtwtlt and new issuance of debt qtbt+1. In case of repayment the gov-
ernment has access to issue debt domestically bt+1 at price qt. Also government’s have to repay
one-period government debt issued at previous period bt. In case of default, the government
repudiates the total stock of debt bt but is not able to issue new debt bt+1. At the end of the
period the government can recover the access to domestic financial markets with probability
(1 − θ) with a zero debt to repay.
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In this economy the aggregate resource constraint that emerges from consolidating the
household budget constraint, banks’ balance sheets and accumulated net worth, and govern-
ment budget constraint is
ct + g + it = F(kt, lt)
where I define the investment as it = kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt + Φ(kt+1, kt).
2.2.5 Competitive equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium given government policies {g, τ, b}∞t=0 is a set of allocations {c, l, k, d, π}
∞
t=0
and prices {q,R, r,w}∞t=0 such that:
Allocations {c, l, , d}∞t=0 solves household’s problem.
Allocations {b, k, d}∞t=0 solves banker’s problem.
Allocations {k, l}∞t=0 solves firm’s problem.
Government’s policies {g, τ, b}∞t=0 satisty the government’s budget constraint.
The aggregate resource constraint holds.
Market clearing for bonds, deposits, capital, labor.
2.2.6 Recursive problem
In the recursive problem the state variables are b, k, d, z which represent bonds, capital, de-
posits, and the exogenous TFP process, respectively. Before proceeding to show the govern-
ment’s recursive problem, I define several results from the bankers’ problem that allows me to
characterize the price of the government debt.
Proposition 1. In the recursive banks’ problem:
i) Bankers’ value function is linear in net worth.
ii) The price of the domestic bond can be represented as:
q =
E[Λ̂(b′, k′, d′, z′) [1 − D(b′, k′, d′, z′)]
E[Λ̂(b′, k′, d′, z′)R(b′, k′, d′, z′)]
where the adjusted discounted factor of the banks’ problem is represented with Λ̂(b′, k′, d′, z′) =
EΛ(b′, k′, d′, z′)[ψ+ (1−ψ)α(b′, k′, d′, z′)] and α(b, k, d, z) is the banks’ marginal value of their
wealth.
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Proof see appendix C.
From proposition 1 we can observe several results that allow us to characterize bankers’
problem solution. First, the linearity of the vale function we can obtain that bankers’ dividends
πb are zero. Second, the price of the government’s bond is the discounted expected return to
capital for the next period adjusted for the probability of repayment. The discount factor is
Λ̂(b′, k′, d′, z′) considers that a banker can remain as financial intermediary with probability
(1 − ψ). Therefore, with probability 1 − ψ the discount factor incorporates the marginal value
of remaining as a banker.
In the government’s recursive problem, it chooses policies for debt issuance b′ and default
decision D considering the optimality conditions in the competitive equilibrium of the economy
given the current state of the economy (b, k, d, z). The problem can be described as follows:
V(b, k, d, z) = max
D∈{0,1}
{
VR(b, k, d, z),VNR(k, d, z)
}
and the value for repayment solves
VR(b, k, d, z) = max
c,k′,b′,d′,l




zF(k, l) = c + i + g

















R = zFK(k, l) + (1 − δ)
w = zFl(k, l)
d′
r = λN
k′ + qb′ = d + N
N = ψ(Rk + b − d) − (1 − ψ)n̄.
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and the value for default solves
VNR(k, d, z) = max
c,k′,d′,l
{





zF(k, l) = c + i + g














R = zFK(k, l) + (1 − δ)






N = ψ(Rk − d) − (1 − ψ)n̄.
Recursive Markov Equilibrium. In this economy a recursive equilibrium are government
policy functions D(b, k, d, z), borrowing decisions B(b, k, d, z), value functions V(b, k, d, z),
VR(b, k, d, z), VNR(k, d, z), and the bond price schedule q(b, k, d, z) such that: (i) the policy and
the value functions satisfy its optimization problem; (ii) the government’s debt price schedule
satisfy q(b, k, d, z) = E[Λ̂(b
′,k′,d′,z′)[1−D(b′,k′,d′,z′)]




In this section, I discuss the strategy for the parametrization of the model. One set of param-
eters was taken from the quantitative macroeconomic literature. The other sets of parameters
were calibrated to match a set of moments from emerging economies that had experienced a
sovereign default followed by an episode of distress in credit intermediation as defined by Bal-
teanu and Erce (2018) for the period of 1980–2005 (this sample is described in the appendix).
The model was solved on a quarterly basis and the set of moments computed from the simu-
lations were adjusted to represent the annual realization from the data. Accordingly, the stock
variables represent the current realization and the flow variables were adjusted to represent the
average during the last four quarters.









where the σ is the coefficient of risk aversion, which is set to 2 (as is standard in quantitative
macroeconomics).3 The parameter ω controls the curvature of the labor disutility and is set at
1.5, which is consistent with a Frisch wage elasticity of labor supply of 1
ω
= 2. 4
The firm follows a constant return to scale technology:
F(k, n) = kαl1−α (2.2)
where the capital share parameter in the benchmark calibration is α = 0.36 – as is standard in
the literature.
The TFP shock follows an AR(1) process:
logzt = ρzlogzt−1 + εt (2.3)
with εt
iid
∼ N(0,σ2z ). I calibrated the parameters for TFP following the strategy of incorporat-
ing capital in a sovereign default model calibrated for emerging economies (see Roldan-Pena,
3The specification removes the wealth effect on labor supply. Otherwise, episodes of default, which are
accompanied by a fall in TFP or consumption, would reflect an increase in labor supply.
4Other studies of sovereign default that consider capital as a factor of production function calibrate the Frisch
wage elasticity at the level of 2 as in the study of Pei (2016) and of 0.85 as in the study of Gordon and Guerron-
Quintana (2017). With respect to other studies that considered only labor as the unique factor of production,
the range can be described as follows, while Mendoza and Yue (2012) targeted an elasticity of 2.2, Sosa-Padilla
(2018) and Cuadra et al. (2010) considered an elasticity of 0.667 and 0.689, respectively.
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2011; Gordon and Guerron-Quintana, 2017; Park, 2017). On the one hand, the persistence
process was settled at ρz=0.95, which is line with values used in other studies. On the other
hand, the standard deviation of the TFP was set at σz = 2.1%, which is consistent with the
volatility of output at σz = 2.4% – the average standard deviation of the emerging economies
experiencing domestic credit distress after a default measured with data from the International
Financial Statistics (IFS) database.
The transferring to entering bankers was set to 0.003, which is consistent with the per-
fect interbank market parameter as shown in the study of Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010).5. The
bankers’ survival rate was set at ψ = 0.97, which is consistent with the findings of Bocola
(2016) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010).6 I calibrated the parameter for the bank’s financial
frictions λ to match the deposits to the GDP average of 0.32 for the sample in the study of Bal-
teanu and Erce (2018) using data from the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD)
from the World Bank. The parameter g was set to match the government expenditure to GDP
average of 15 % as observed in the IFS.
The capital depreciation rate δ was set at 0.0425 (17 % annual rate) to target a level of
investment-to-GDP of 0.22 as observed in the GFDD for upper–middle income countries. I
used this parameter to target such statistics in line with those found by Gordon and Guerron-
Quintana (2017) and Pei (2016). Also, the functional form for capital adjustment was set as is




(k′ − k)2, (2.4)
where the parameter affecting the cost Θ was set at 7 in order to match the volatility of the
5The parameter for the transferring for entering bankers remained low in order to not affect the aggregate
implications of the model during default events. This parameter can resemble the period by period endowment
that bankers received in the findings of Sosa-Padilla (2018). In fact, for this author, this parameter was important
for measuring the exposure of the bank to sovereign risk. It can affect the size of the credit crunch and output
drop. In the section designed for default events, we observed that the model was able to capture the drop in output
observed in the model as well as without any parameter having driven this fall as shown in the study of Mendoza
and Yue (2012) and Sosa-Padilla (2018)
6In this model, the size of the parameter ψ impacts the size of the banking net worth that can be used as
collateral ψN + (1 − ψ)n̄. A decrease in the survival rate increases the share of the net worth, which is composed
of a constant endowment that the new banker receives. I tried to maintain a high enough banking survival rate
ψ in order to avoid n̄ playing a role in the credit contraction. In general, other studies use a high value for this
parameter as shown in the study of (Bocola, 2016), who estimated this parameter for Italy, (Gonzalez-Aguado,
2019), who used this parameter for bankers in emerging economies, and Perez, who used it to calibrate the share
of debt held by banks.
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investment to volatility of output of 3.91 in the sample.
The value for the probability to reentry to financial markets after a default θ was set at 0.10,
which is consistent with an exclusion of three years. This parameter was set in accordance
with previous studies considering domestic defaults the estimate vary between 1.25-4 years
(see Sosa-Padilla, 2018, Perez et al., 2015, and Pei, 2016).7
The discounting parameter β was set at 0.976 to match the annual default rate of 2.5 %.
I considered a nonlinear cost of default min{z, 0.95} over the TFP as was demonstrated in the
study of (Arellano, 2008) to calibrate an average of 12 % balance sheet exposure of domestic
banks to government bonds using data from the IFS. This measure consisted of the ratio of an
intermediary bank’s net claims to government as a fraction of its net total assets. This captured
the share of the consolidated financial system balance sheet, which is exposed to an outright
default from government.8
On the one hand, this moment is important because it sets the average exposure of the
balance sheet to the sovereign bond, which is the risky asset. On the other hand, it establishes
the average target at which sovereign debt crowd-outs investment.
7Other quantitative considering the exclusion from international financial markets calibrate this parameter in
order to be consistent with a range from 2-6 years, which is consistent with empirical estimates across a sample
of episodes of default (see Richmond and Dias, 2009 and Gelos et al., 2011). While Richmond and Dias (2009)
provided estimates of the average (median) time of exclusion between 5.7 (3) years, Gelos et al. (2011) found
that, on average, it took around two to 4.5 years to recover partial market access. Quantitative studies analyzing
sovereign default on external debt had targeted an average exclusion of around three–six years (see Arellano and
Ramanarayanan, 2012, Cuadra et al., 2010, and Mendoza and Yue, 2012).
8I constructed this measure following the method of Kumhof and Tanner, 2005, which is commonly used by
several studies (see Gennaioli et al., 2014, Gennaioli et al., 2018, and Asonuma et al., 2015).
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Table 2.1: Parameters used in the model
Parameter Value Source
Literature
Bank’s initial net worth n̄ = 0.003 Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)
Capital share α = 0.3% Standard
Curvature of labor disutility ω = 1.5 Frisch Labor elasticity
TFP process ρz = 0.95 Emerging economies
Calibrated
TFP Volatility σz = 2.1% Output volatility 1.5 %
Depreciation rate δ = 0.0425 Capital to GDP 21 %
Collateral constraint λ = 0.3 Deposits to GDP 25 %
Cost of default min{z, 0.95} Annual default rate 2.5 %
Government expenditure g = 0.09 Government expenditure to GDP 14 %
Discount factor β = 0.976 12 % of bank’s balance sheet exposure




The model was able to reproduce targeted moments along with a set of untargeted moments.
The model shows that, on average, one-third of the observed domestic debt can be issued.
The ability of the model to obtain that level of domestic debt is related to the endogenous
cost of default. As default triggers a decrease in net worth, it directly affects capital for the
next period and its ability to raise deposits in the following periods. The difference between
the saving and the lending rate is close to what it is observed in the data. On the part of the
lending rate R, this spread incorporates the effect of the crowding-out of capital investment.
The model demonstrates that consumption is more volatile than output as is usual in emerging
economies and what is found in other studies of sovereign default. The correlation of output
with consumption, deposits, and investment is closely related to the data. Finally, the hours
worked are closely related to the standard of one-third of the total amount of time.
2.4.2 Dynamics around events of associated
In this section we study the model’s ability to match the macroeconomic dynamics around
episodes of default that could lead to a disruption in the intermediation of the domestic credit.
In particular, I follow the work of Balteanu and Erce (2018), which identified events of sovereign
default that were followed by a banking crisis in a period of up to three years. A default win-
dow considers three years in the run-up to default, the year of the default, and three years in
the aftermath of the default. In these default event windows, I have contrasted the evolution of
several observed variables by means of the simulations of the calibrated model.
Given the features of the model, I considered the default event classification used by Bal-
teanu and Erce (2018) as a reasonable empirical benchmark for several reasons. First, it showed
empirical evidence that suggested that, unlike default events not followed by a domestic credit
distress, in the run-up, banks were highly exposed to government debt, and the default trig-
gered a systemic loss on banks’ balance sheets. Therefore, this suggests that the main force
triggering a banking crisis is the effect on the balance sheet caused by default.9 Second, the
definition of a banking crisis considers that there exists a major decrease in the external funding
of banks through deposits. This is featured and included in the model, and its dynamics can be
9This dynamic is consistent with the evidence shown in the study of Gennaioli et al. (2018). In a comple-
mentary paper, Gennaioli et al. (2014) provided evidence showing that, upon default, a banking system highly
exposed to government debt was associated with an important decrease in the credit flow of the economy.
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Table 2.2: Simulations:Data and Model
Non-Target Statistics Model Data
Mean domestic debt to GDP 0.10 0.17
Mean spread E(R − r) 6.71 6.94
Consumptions’s standard to output’s standard deviation 2.10 1.47
Correlation consumption and output 0.98 0.60
Correlation deposits and output -0.04 -0.01
Correlation investment and output 0.38 0.50
Worked hours 0.31 0.33
Target statistics
Mean Investment to GDP 0.22 0.21
Standard deviation of output 2.72 2.58
Investment standard deviation to GDP standard deviation 3.74 4.25
Bank’s balance-sheet exposure 0.12 0.12
Mean deposits to GDP 0.22 0.25
Government’s expenditure to GDP 0.18 0.14
Periods of exclusion (years) 2.9 3
Probability to default 2.7 2.5
All variables are logged and then de-trended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, with a
smoothing parameter of 6.25.
compared with the data. Third, the empirical evidence suggested that these episodes showed
a limited capital account openness. These authors mentioned that in this context, governments
rely more on domestic markets to issue debt. This is important as the model features a closed
economy, and in these events, domestic and external debt accounts for 75 and 25) % of the
total public debt, respectively.10
10In other classifications, it is difficult to differentiate the affect that external defaults have against domestic
defaults. Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) brought a detailed narrative regarding the unfolding at the run-up
and aftermath of a sovereign default. They detailed that, while there existed a differentiated treatment of domestic
and foreign debt holders in the default of Argentina in 2001 and Ecuador in 1999, these countries defaulted on
both types of debt in a short period of time.
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Figure 2.1 plots the dynamics around a three-year window of a default followed by a bank-
ing crisis in the data and in the model. In this window, the time at zero implies the moment of
default. While the negative periods imply the years in the run-up to default, the positive periods
show the aftermath of the default. The green dotted lines show the deviation HP-filtered trend
except for the labor supply and balance sheet, which are reported in levels. The shaded areas
correspond to the intervals plus and minus one standard deviation from the mean. The solid
blue lines are predicted by the model. Finally, the solid black bar at -1 shows the date at which
the output reached a maximum prior to default.
The model is able to replicate the dynamics of several macroeconomic and financial vari-
ables. It can replicate the boom and bust dynamics in the run-up and in the aftermath of default.
The timing of the model allows for these dynamics to be matched. First, as default reduces a
bank’s net worth, investment drops at T=0; therefore, output and consumption drop until T = 1.
Second, as the net worth decreases in T = 0, the external deposits that have to be paid in T = 1
fall. The decrease in deposits affects the accumulation of new capital goods in T = 1, which
affects deposits issued in T + 2. In the plot, total assets drop at T=0 and continue to fall until
T = 2. The model reproduces the first fall as the effect of a default on a bank’s balance sheet.
As capital is the only asset during default, the model reproduces this dynamic as a lag with
respect to investment.
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Source: Global Financial Database, International Financial Statistics, and author’s calculations. Default event
which is followed by a banking crisis given the database of Balteanu and Erce (2018). The solid blueline cor-
responds to the mean trajectory of the calibrated model’s simulated at the default event. The green dashed line
corresponds to the mean trajectory observed in the data at different default events followed by a banking crisis
at the dates described in Balteanu and Erce (2018). The gray shadow area corresponds the interval of +/- ones
standard deviation around the mean of the data. The solid black line at T=-1 is the moment at which the output
find its highest realization previous to the default.
I examine empirically whether, during a default, a bank’s balance sheet exposure to the gov-
ernment’s debt triggers adverse effects on investment. I follow the strategy shown by Gennaioli
et al. (2014) to test whether a bank’s balance sheet exposure is associated with a disruption on
private credit markets. This strategy consists of regressing the variable expected to be disrupted
on the event of default, the government’s bondholdings as a share of the bank’s balance sheet,
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and the interaction of both variables in the year previous to default.
I use a panel of countries including middle-income and high-income countries during the
years between 1980–2005 using data from GFDD. The default events are those considered by
Balteanu and Erce (2018). As a dependent variable, I consider two measures of investment: 1)
investment as a deviation of the HP-filtered trend and 2) investment-to-GDP in annual growth
rates. By using investment as a deviation of the HP-filtered trend, I test whether the model’s
predictions can be observed in the data. By using the investment-to-GDP, I use a similar vari-
able to that used by Gennaioli et al. (2014), and I test if the exposure to the government’s bonds
affect the level capital formation in economies experiencing default.
In terms of the empirical strategy, I depart from that used by Gennaioli et al. (2014) by
separating default events of those where the default was followed by a contraction in domestic







= β1(DefaultCDi,t−1) + β2(DefaultCDi,t−1) · (Bondholdingsi,t−1)
β3(Defaulti,t−1) + β4(Defaulti,t−1) · (Bondholdingsi,t−1)
+ β5(Bondholdingsi,t−1) + αi + νt+X′i,t−1γ + εi,t.
(2.5)
where the i superscript identifies countes, the t superscript identifies years, and the CD su-
perscript represents the default events with credit distress after the default – as identified by
Balteanu and Erce (2018). The bank’s balance sheet exposure is measured as discussed in the
calibration. In addition, I use control for shocks that affect the supply and demand for credit
during episodes of default.11. I allow the interaction and the testable implication is that invest-
ment as a deviation to HP-filtered trend (investment to GDP) decrease after default in countries
with banks more exposed to sovereign debt (i.e. β2 < 0 and β4 < 0).
11While it is difficult to describe a causality from default and bank exposure on credit on credit, I intend to
capture a negative correlation that prevails once other economic conditions are accounted for. By using GDP
growth, unemployment, and inflation, I control for the adverse economic conditions that affect the demand for
credit and the distress that could trigger default episodes. I consider exchange rate depreciation as this could affect
the balance sheet of non-banking private agents and their demand for credit. Given that governments could issue
debt in foreign currency, a depreciation is also associated with a potential default. I also consider episodes of
sudden stops that affect the supply of credit for private agents, including the banking and public sectors. Finally,
I control for the existence of a banking crisis previous to the default event as these had an effect on credit prior to
the realization of the government’s debt repudiation.
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Panel (a) in table (2.3) shows the estimates for (3.1) when the dependent variable is an
investment that deviates from the HP-trend. In this regression, we can observe that the inter-
action is statistically significant, and its range is around −0.19 to −0.24. With this estimate,
the impact of a default when banks hold an exposure of 12% is around a 2.28% to 2.88% drop
of investment as deviation of its HP-filter. Panel (b) in table (2.3) shows the estimates for
Table 2.3: Regression: Investmentand on Default and Bondholdings
Panel a: Investment deviation to HP-filtered trend
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(DefaultCDi,t−1)·(Bondholdingsi,t−1) -0.195** -0.190** -0.241*** -0.230***
Observations 1470 1470 1470 1300
Country Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Annual Time Effects No No Yes Yes
Panel b: Investment to GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(DefaultCDi,t−1)·(Bondholdingsi,t−1) -0.0586** -0.0351** -0.0760*** -0.0291***
Observations 1504 1504 1504 1472
Country Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Annual Time Effects No No Yes Yes
The specification which include country fixed effects and annual time effects includes
controls. The specification without controls remains statistically significant in the
interaction term for bond-holdings and default.
(3.1) when the dependent variable is the investment to GDP. In this regression, we can observe
that the interaction is statistically significant, and its range is around −0.0351 to −0.076. With
this estimate, the impact of a default when banks hold an exposure of 12% is a drop of around
0.421% to 0.912% in the investment to GDP.
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2.4.3 Sensitivity analysis: distortions in capital accumulation
I analyze how the default incentives and capital accumulation interact in the model. On the
one hand, sovereign borrowing affects capital accumulation by reducing banks’ resources that
can be used for investment. At the same time, capital is an asset that can be used for insurance
against TFP shocks. Therefore, sovereign borrowing affects the accumulation of assets that can
be used for consumption smoothing (see Gordon and Guerron-Quintana, 2017; Pei, 2016). In
the model, sovereign borrowing is a costly process that, by affecting capital accumulation, de-
creases the ability of the government to smooth consumption. On the other hand, by increasing
the cost of default, a higher issuance of sovereign debt decreases the default probability.
In this section, I quantitatively evaluate the ex-ante effects of government borrowing vis-
a-vis its effects ex-post in the model. I recalibrate the model in order to target a moment that
affects government borrowing ex-ante while retaining all the other parameters of the bench-
mark calibration. In particular, in order to measure the ex-ante effects of default, I focus on
how capital accumulation statistics, namely, mean investment to GDP and the volatility ratio
of investment to GDP, can be affected by the new targeted moment. In order to measure the
effects on consumption smoothing, I compute the volatility ratio of consumption to GDP.
First, I evaluate how an increase in the banks’ bondholdings as a share of total assets affects
ex-ante investment, the volatility ratio of investment to GDP, and consumption to GDP. I con-
trast these effects with an adjustment in the probability to default. Second, I provide evidence
that economies with high access to deposits show higher investment and a lower volatility ratio
of investment to GDP and consumption to GDP. I recalibrate the model to match deposits to
GDP and show that the model is able to reproduce this pattern. I explain the quantitative prop-
erties of the model that allow for the reproduction of this empirical pattern.
Bondholdings In Table 2.4, I study the importance of bondholdings’ exposure in the model.
I recalibrate the model in order to match a share of bondholdings to total assets at 0.20. The
model predicts that investment to GDP decreases from 0.22 to 0.18 as more assets are used to
finance government borrowing. The volatility ratio of investment to GDP and consumption to
GDP increases by 40 % and 54 %, respectively. This increase in the volatility ratio implies
that more debt is absorbed by banks and that this issuance disrupts the flow of funds more
frequently. As a consequence of the lower capital accumulation, the insurance that capital pro-
vides in fluctuations of GDP decreases. For these reasons, the model predicts that the volatility
ratio of consumption to GDP increases.
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Table 2.4: Simulation: Increase in bondholding exposure
Panel a: Government bonds to bank’s assets
Benchmark High
0.12 0.18
Mean Investment to GDP 0.22 0.18 ↓
Investment std. dev. to GDP std. dev. 3.74 4.63 ↑
Consumption std. dev. to GDP std. dev. 2.10 2.38 ↑
Probability to default 2.7 1.01 ↓
In the table we recalibrate the model to match the statistic related to the column High. In panel A, I
recalibrate the model to match an exposure of 0.20 which is associate with a change in the persistence
parameter. In order to compare for the excess of volatility with respect to GDP, I recalibrate the standard
deviation of the TFP shock.
Deposits The first two columns from Table 2.5 show the conditional moments for a high
and low level of deposits to GDP that was observed in the sample of countries from the data.
In order to determine if a country is part of the group of high or low level, I computed the
mean deposits to GDP for each country around the sample period and sorted the observations
above or below the median as high or low, respectively. The conditional moments are the mean
investment to GDP, volatility ratio of investment to GDP, and volatility ratio of consumption
to GDP for each group (i.e. high or low). The third and fourth columns of Table 2.5 show
moments simulated by a calibration of the model in order to target the high and low level of
deposits to GDP by modifying the parameter for the financial friction .
The data shows that economies with high or low access to deposits to GDP observe higher
or lower capital accumulation and a lower or higher volatility ratio of investment to GDP and
consumption to GDP, respectively. The model is able to recover the same feature. This feature
highlights the role of capital as an asset for consumption smoothing. In the model, the econ-
omy has a higher access to deposits as it increases the share of net worth λ that can be used
as a collateral. Ex-ante banks expand the resources available that can be used for investments
and for bond purchases. As can be observed, with a higher access to deposits, the capital accu-
mulation increases. Also, the volatility ratio of investment to GDP decreases as bond issuance
has lower distortions in this economy. Hence, the volatility ratio of consumption to output also
decreases as capital is used as an insurance against TFP shocks.
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Table 2.5: Simulation: Increase in deposits-to-GDP
Data Model
Low High Low High
Mean deposits to GDP 0.15 0.34 0.15 0.32
Mean Investment to GDP 0.19 0.22 0.17 0.28
Investment std. dev. to GDP std. dev. 4.81 3.68 3.53 3.71
Consumption std. dev. to GDP std. dev. 1.52 1.42 2.45 2.10
Probability to default - - 7.8 1.28
In the table we recalibrate the model to match the statistic related to the column
Data. I recalibrate the model with the parameter λ to match countries with low
deposits to GDP and high deposits to GDP. In order to compare for the excess
of volatility with respect to GDP, I recalibrate the standard deviation of the TFP
shock.
The ex-post cost of default also changes when the economy faces different targeted levels
of deposits. The probability to default decreases as the economy has higher assets to deposits.
This is for two reasons. First, in the model, a higher level of collateral λ used for deposits
introduces a higher credit disruption in the economy. Therefore, it is costly for the government
to decrease the supply of external funds when this provides an important share of resources in
order to invest and to buy bonds. Second, as the economy has more capital, the economy has
more resources to repay. In the current case, as more deposits decrease the crowding-out of
capital, it allows for the accumulation of a higher stock of capital.
The two effects can be illustrated in Figure 2.2. Panel (a) shows the default probability
when banks issue high and low claims from a household’s deposits, which hold capital, and the
TFP at the median level of the grid on its respective dimension. The solid and dotted lines show
the probability of default for a high or low level of deposits, respectively and which are values
above or below the mean level of deposits in the grid, respectively. In this plot, the probability
to default for a high level of deposits is always below that for a low level of capital. The
government will try to avoid default when the level of external finance is high. Panel (b) shows
the default probability when the economy accumulates a high or low level of capital, holding
deposits and the TFP at the median level of the grid on its respective dimension. The solid and
dotted lines show the probability of default for a high or low level of capital accumulated above
or below the mean capital in the grid, respectively. The probability to default for a high level
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of capital is always below that for a low level of capital. As mentioned above, a higher stock
of capital allows the government to repay with higher probability.

















































Source: Author’s calculations. Probability of default in the model along different levels of government’s debt.
Panel (a) shows the probability of default when the economy face high and low levels of deposits. Panel (b)
shows the probability of default when the economy face high and low levels of aggregate capital.
2.4.4 Tax adjustment during the default episode
The simulations of the numerical solution show that during a default episode, the government
is able to cushion a sudden increase in the labor tax in order to repay its debt and maintain its
level of expenditure g. Figure 2.3 shows the dynamics of the labor tax rate in equilibrium vis-
a-vis the tax rate that arise in cases of repaying and continuing to issue debt around the default
window. The solid and dotted lines show the dynamics of the equilibrium and counterfactual
tax rates in cases of default and repayment, respectively. Once default is announced, the tax
rate suddenly increases in both cases, but the adjustment is lower in the default equilibrium by
6 %. This difference in the adjustment is almost constant in the aftermath of default. In this
setup, the government uses default as a mechanism to avoid a sudden increase in the wage rate
tax.12
12The adjustment in tax rates is a similar property to that shown by Sosa-Padilla (2018). In fact, this author
quantified that, for Argentina’s default in 2001, the government should have levied a tax 20 % higher in case of
repayment. Also, contrary to my findings that wage rates increase even around default, this author believed that
the wage rate should decrease in a default.
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Author’s calculations. Labor tax rate during a default episode. The solid line in black shows the tax rate that
the government impose in equilibrium in case of a default. The dotted line in blue shows the tax rate that arise in
case of repaying its debt instead of defaulting.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I studied how capital accumulation can be disrupted by a sovereign default
through financial intermediation. I explored these consequences in a model that combined
capital accumulation, sovereign default, and financial frictions. In the model, banks make in-
vestment decisions for capital accumulation in the economy. Governments can only sell bonds
to banks; hence, the resources used for buying bonds crowd-out investment. Banks can accu-
mulate net worth and issue it as a collateral for receiving deposits from households. During a
sovereign default, a bank’s net worth decreases, its ability to issue deposits also decreases, and
it adjusts its investments in new capital goods.
I calibrated the model to match the moments of a set of economies that experienced a de-
fault followed by a credit disruption. I have shown that the calibrated model can reproduce
the untargeted dynamics around default of output, investment, deposits, and assets for these
economies. After the default, capital is the only asset in a bank’s balance sheet; therefore, the
dynamics of assets and deposits are driven by capital accumulation after default. I provided
empirical evidence that supports the fact that, during a default, capital accumulation is nega-
tively correlated with the ratio of bonds to assets held by banks.
I used the calibrated model to show how ex-ante to a default, sovereign debt decreases
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capital accumulation and increases investment volatility. In fact, this suggests that disrupting
capital accumulation decreases its ability to insure against TFP shocks. Therefore, the model
shows the volatility ratio of consumption to GDP increases, which is associated with a lesser
ability to smooth consumption.
Finally, I demonstrated, in the sample of economies considered, that those with lower or
higher access to deposits face lower or higher capital accumulation and higher or lower volatil-
ity ratio of investment to GDP and consumption to GDP, respectively. The model was able to
reproduce this fact by considering the ability of capital to be used as an insurance against TFP
shocks. In the model, a lower access to deposits implied that resources available for a bank’s
operations decrease. In fact, banks invest less in capital as they have to buy bonds. In turn,
as banks are constrained in the use of funds, bond issuance produces investments that become
more volatile with respect to GDP. As capital is reduced and its accumulation becomes more
volatile, the ability of capital to insure the economy against shocks to TFP is reduced.
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Chapter 3
Domestic debt and public debt
sustainability
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I quantitatively study the role of domestic debt issuance in public debt sustain-
ability and develop a model of sovereign default that incorporates both domestic banks and
foreign investors. According to the model, the government cannot discriminate across bond-
holders. Therefore, it is costly to default to foreign investors, as this also affects domestic
banks. By issuing more domestic debt, a government increases its incentives to repay and im-
prove its borrowing conditions. The model is calibrated to simulate the default rate and the
average bondholding exposure of the banking system for an emerging economy. I show that
the model can simultaneously replicate the untargeted structure of foreign to domestic debt as
well as several business cycle statistics.
I also provide a rationale for the empirical relationship according to which the sovereign
spread is negatively correlated with the stock of domestic debt held by different countries. In
the model, the variation in the bondholding exposure of the banking system allows for this
negative relationship to improve. A government with higher bondholding exposure has lower
incentives to default, as this can trigger a credit crunch in the economy. First, the sovereign
spread decreases with the lower willingness to default. Second, the government issues more
domestic debt, as it can in this way strategically improve the cost of foreign borrowing.
I go on to document evidence showing that domestic banks’ balance sheets are highly ex-
posed to local government bonds. On average, a domestic bank maintains around 12% of its
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balance sheet as sovereign debt and holds 25% of the total stock of public debt. Given such
exposure, it is estimated that, during sovereign default episodes, domestic credit decreases by
4% of GDP on average. In addition, I empirically demonstrate that the risk of sovereign default
implied from bond prices is negatively correlated with the exposure of domestic banks’ bal-
ance sheets to local government bonds. A rationale for the latter relationship is that investors
consider that the willingness to default decreases with the risk of triggering a decrease in credit
intermediation.
I further build a model considering previous empirical evidence. In the model, final goods
producers face intra-period working capital constraints. Domestic banks use their assets, in-
cluding government debt, to issue loans for financially constrained firms. Banks’ bond holdings
are risky, as a government can default its debt. In the case of default, banks’ assets are reduced,
producing a credit crunch in the economy.
A benevolent government issues short-term debt to international investors and domestic
banks, but it cannot discriminate among domestic and foreign bondholders. As a result, it
issues a single bond, and its price compensates the marginal foreign investors for the risk of
default. In turn, the probability to default is determined by the structure of the debt held by
foreign investors and domestic banks. While the repudiation of debt decreases the amount that
foreign lenders should pay, the default is costly for private domestic intermediation. As a re-
sult, the bond price worsens with the increase of foreign debt, while it improves with increases
in domestic debt.
Two benefits are considered in the decision to issue domestic debt. First, the decision can
be rationalized as saving resources for future returns. Given the use of debt for final goods
production, the benefit of investing in domestic bonds is that, in repayment states, they provide
future resources and liquidity to financially constrained firms. Second, given that decisions
are centralized, the government can internalize how domestic bond holdings are dealt with and
improve the price of bonds sold to foreign investors.
I calibrate the model to an emerging economy, matching the annual default rate and average
bank balance sheet exposure to government bonds. The model fits several standard business
cycle moments and shows that interest rate spread decreases with the share of debt held by
banks. In particular, the model is close to replicating the structure of domestic and foreign
debt observed in the data. I extend the benchmark model to allow for risk premiums affecting
interest rate spreads. The structure of domestic and foreign debt is preserved when introducing
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this element, which adjusts for the level of sovereign spreads.
I demonstrate use of the model, showing that it can reproduce the negative relationship
between sovereign spreads and the domestic stock of debt. I recalibrate the model over the
average bondholding exposure to match a grid of stock of debt and compute the associated
interest rate spread. In line with the evidence observed in the empirical section, I show quanti-
tively that this relationship is negative.
Related Literature. This paper is related to several strands of research connecting sovereign
debt and banking crises. The first strand studies the interaction of banking sectors and strategic
government sovereign debt repayment through the use of quantitative models à la Eaton and
Gersovitz (1981). In an important study, Sosa-Padilla (2018) study the cost that the default
has on domestic credit intermediation through the damage done to banking balance sheets in a
closed economy where domestic banks are the only source of demands for bonds. In this pre-
vious paper, benefits from the default arise because the government decreases its tax rate. With
regard to this point, I extend the work of Sosa-Padilla (2017) by adding international investors
and inducing the government to make optimal decisions on the bank’s bond holding, while
the previous model incorporated banks operating in competitive equilibrium. In my model,
the benefits of default result from debt not being repaid to international investors. Crucially,
unlikeSosa-Padilla (2018), my model assumes that the government solves an optimal portfolio
of two different assets and evaluates the benefits versus the costs. One benefit of issuing do-
mestic debt is thus that it improves the cost of borrowing from external investors.
Perez et al. (2015) developed a model according to which banks that do not have oppor-
tunities to invest in productive projects use bonds as an asset to retain their current resources
and obtain liquidity in the future. During a default, endogenous costs occur because of the de-
fault’s effect on balance sheets, and more banks decide to invest in bonds instead of productive
opportunities. My study differs from Perez et al. (2015) in two respects. First, in my model,
endogenous costs only arise through the default’s effect on balance sheets, allowing me to sim-
plify the model and consider government centralization of banks’ bond holdings. Second, the
government internalizes the effect of domestic bond holdings on costs.
Other papers have also analyzed the effect of sovereign debt on banks. For example, Bo-
cola (2016) evaluated the effect of sovereign risk on banks’ lending conditions. In this previous
paper, the economy was considered closed, and sovereign risk was modeled exogenously. In
addition, the banking sector was considered endogenous capital accumulation. The paper went
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on to study how sovereign risk affected banks’ balance sheets and lending conditions. In con-
trast, my model considers an open economy banking sector with an intra-period balance sheet
effect. More importantly, in contrast to Bocola (2016), who included an exogenous source of
sovereign risk, my model endogenizes the decision to default.
Another strand of related literature includes studies that explore the connections among
sovereign debt, banks, and debt sustainability. Gennaioli et al. (2014) studied the importance
of introducing sovereign debt in the domestic banking sector for debt sustainability. This pa-
per introduced a finite-horizon model and developed the theoretical implications that domes-
tic bond holdings have for debt sustainability. Acharya and Rajan (2013) developed a finite-
horizon model according to which government myopia due to political changes induces limited
commitment to repay foreign debt. These authors also mention that a tax policy forcing do-
mestic banks to hold debt could decrease the problems regarding limited commitment. Chari
et al. (2014) developed a model according to which financial repression is optimal because it
induces banks to maintain domestic reserves for government borrowing to mitigate the wors-
ening of financial conditions in foreign markets (in particular, the financial repression during
sudden stop episodes). In contrast to these theoretical studies, my model provides a quantita-
tive framework to explore the role of domestic debt in debt sustainability and can be compared
with empirical data.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides empirical evidence of several chan-
nels incorporated in my model. Section 3 presents the theoretical model to be used for quanti-
tative purposes. Section 4 shows the quantitative analysis. Finally, Section 6 gives the project’s
conclusions.
3.2 Empirical evidence
In this section I show three empirical facts related to the importance of the sovereign-banking
connection. The purpose is to provide evidence of the importance of domestic debt under the
assumption that a government cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign investors.
The first fact shows that banks’ balance sheets are highly exposed to sovereign debt. The sec-
ond evidence shows that in episodes of default such exposure affect the flow of private credit in
the domestic economy. Third, I show that sovereign spreads, associated with the risk of default,
are negatively correlated with domestic’s banks exposure. I connect these facts, by suggesting
that these lines of evidence are related to the idea that a government will pay a lower cost for
its debt because defaulting is costly for banks’ intermediation purposes.
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Banks’ bondholdings. Banks are significant holders of the total amount of government
debt and show high exposure of their balance sheets to this asset. I show that such exposure
can be important to disrupt domestic credit intermediation in case of default. First, in cross-
section, there are several countries where the banking system is a major holder of domestic debt
issued by the local government. Second, the observed levels of banks’ balance sheet exposure
to public debt are significant.
Figure B.1 shows the importance of domestic debt as a share of total public debt for several
countries.1 Panel (a) shows that around 50% of the total share of the debt is in the hands of
domestic holders: the central bank, private banks, and non-bank intermediaries. In addition,
around two-thirds of the sample of countries have over half of the total debt as domestic debt.
Panel (b) shows that around 40% of domestic debt is held by private banks.
Figure B.2 shows a measure of the exposure of banking systems to government debt for
several countries.2 It consists of the ratio of intermediary banks’ net claims to the government
as a fraction of their total net assets, capturing the share of consolidated financial system bal-
ance sheets that are exposed to an outright government default. Panel (a) shows the average
exposure for several countries. On average, in the sample, a country’s banking system shows
an exposure of around 12% of the balance sheet. Panel (b) shows the evolution of the average
bank’s exposure over a country-year average. This graph shows that, on average, the banking
exposure to public debt fluctuated between 10% to 14%.3
The exposure of the banking systems to sovereign debt is significant when considering the
BIS regulation framework for settling limits for the exposure of a bank to risky assets: each
country considers maximum exposure to one single asset in the range of 10% to 25% (see
Committee et al., 2014).4 However, this comparison should include additional adjustments to
be valid. While the regulatory framework considers assets valued by its risk-weights, imposed
1I used the database from Arslanalp and Tsuda (2014) where they estimated the share of sovereign bond
holdings in the hands of different types of investors. These estimates considered a sample from 2004 to 2016 and
included 24 countries from Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.
2This measure is commonly used in the literature to measure banks’ exposure to sovereign debt as it has been
documented by Kumhof and Tanner (2005); Gennaioli et al. (2014) and Asonuma et al., 2015.
3While the bank’s exposure measure has a straightforward definition, its construction from International Fi-
nancial Statistics (IFS) data from IMF is not explained. I used data from two IFS surveys: Other Depositary
Survey and Other Financial Corporations Survey. This construction is validated when comparing panel (b) with
the corresponding measure in Gennaioli et al. (2018), figure 1, showing a similar level and dynamics.
4Usually public debt issued by a local government avoids this regulation as such bonds are considered safe
assets.
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by the national regulation, the measures presented above did not consider such weights, as the
data from IFS avoided these measures in their valuation of assets. Therefore, once risk-weights
are considered, the exposure could be smaller. In order to show how reliable is the exposure
of the banking system to government debt, I explored data from the European Banking Union
stress-tests. This data set provides measures of sovereign exposures in fully loaded assets and
risk-weighted assets.
The data showed that banks’ exposures to sovereign risk are important using any definition
of their assets. Figure B.3 shows the sovereign exposure for several countries as a share of
total assets on the balance sheet. Panels (a) and (b) display the sovereign exposure using fully
loaded assets (FLA) and risk-weighted assets (RWA) as the denominator for several European
economies under the stress test for 2014 and 2016, respectively. While in 2014, the FLA mean
exposure (11.7%) was below the RWA exposure (13.14%), during 2016, the 14.7% FLA expo-
sure was close to the 14.6% RWA exposure. In both measures, the average sovereign exposure
remained similar to the 12% observed across countries using IFS data. Panels (d) and (e) dis-
play a scatter plot of sovereign exposure using FLA and RWA. Countries on the left of the
45-degree line showed lower exposures in RWA than FLA. In 2014, most countries were to the
right of the 45-degree line, whereas in 2016, any pattern remained unclear, as most countries
aligned around the 45-degree line. Therefore, excepting France, in 2016, sovereign exposures
as a share of RWA did not appear to be lower than FLA exposures. This evidence supported
the use of IFS data as a source to demonstrate the high exposure of banks’ balance sheets.
Domestic credit markets. I quantify the effect of a default on domestic credit flow as
evidence of the consequences of high exposures. Therefore, I show how banks’ bondholding
exposure could have real consequences in case of default. In particular, I show that private
credit flow decrease after a sovereign default. Furthermore, this effect is more substantial in
economies with higher exposure in their balance sheet to government bonds as those examined
above.
Figure B.4 shows the average change in credit to GDP after default episodes, as weighted by
GDP. Figure B.4, panel (a) shows that during default, the country-year annual change in credit
is around 0.45% of GDP, contrasting with a credit level of 0.91% to GDP during no-default
country-year observations. Therefore, comparisons across default and no-default episodes ten-
tatively revealed that credit flow was lower when the government defaulted its debt. Figure
B.4, panel (b) shows the change in credit flow during episodes of default in country-years with
above, and below, median bond holdings. The figure shows that for country-years with bond
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holding levels below (above) the median, credit flow increased (decreased) by 0.80% (0.50%)
of GDP. This evidence suggested the existence of a potential balance sheet channel where
higher exposure to bonds in default is translated into credit costs.
Previous evidence suggesting that a balance sheet channel operated in default episodes was
not conclusive because other shocks and events that can affect the supply and demand of credit
during a default must be controlled. In the following section, I control for different shocks and
provide an estimate of the impact of default on the flow of credit. The data is annual from 1980
to 2005. I used the following pooled OLS regression to test the implications:
∆(Private Credit)i,t = β1(Sovereing defaulti,t−1)
+ β2(Sovereing defaulti,t−1) · (Bondholdingsi,t−1)
+ αi + νt+X′i,t−1γ + εi,t.
(3.1)
I tested two versions of this model to explain the effects of a default on private credit
growth. In the first, I omitted the interaction term between sovereign debt and banks bond
holdings (β2 = 0). In this specification, a decrease in credit on episodes of sovereign default
(β1 < 0) was tested. In the second version, I allowed the interaction and the testable implication
of private credit decreasing, after default, in countries with banks more exposed to sovereign
debt (β2 < 0).
Each term in the specification of (3.1) deserves special description. While the term αi con-
trolled for fixed effects across countries, νt captured elements of common time variations across
countries, such as commodity price shocks. The term Xi,t−1 refers to control variables affecting
credit supply and demand during episodes of sovereign default. By controlling for conditions
correlated to default events, unexpected effects of a default on credit could also be captured.5
By using GDP growth, unemployment, and inflation, I controlled for adverse economic con-
ditions that affect the demand for credit and the distress that could trigger default episodes.
5Unexpected effects of a sovereign default are difficult to capture because the event is endogenous to economic
conditions. Yeyati and Panizza (2011) document that output contractions precede defaults and that the negative
effect of the default on output could be driven by the anticipation of this event, unconditional on its validation.
However, a default could also be triggered by episodes of economic distress where a government is unwilling to
repay because debt repudiation is optimal. Therefore, several of the control variables were intended to capture the
economic conditions endogenous to the default. I am testing the hypothesis to measure the effect of a default on
credit once its validation has affected the balance sheet. While it is difficult to describe a causality between default
and bank exposure on credit, I intend to capture a prevailing negative correlation once other economic conditions
are accounted for.
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I considered exchange rate depreciation as this could affect the balance sheet of non-banking
private agents and their demand for credit. Given that governments could issue debt in foreign
currency, depreciation was also associated with a potential default. In addition, I considered
episodes of sudden stops affecting the supply of credit for private agents, including the banking
and public sectors. Finally, I controlled for the existence of a banking crisis before the default
event, as these states affect credit before the government realizes debt repudiation.
Table B.1 reports the regression estimates. The baseline estimates are presented in column
(1) and show that credit growth decreases in an episode of sovereign default. In particular,
these estimates implied that after default, private credit drops by 1% of GDP. In column (2),
the interaction term between bank bond holdings and the default is negatively correlated with
private credit flow. The coefficient was marginally statistically significant. In a default event,
the marginal effect of a 10% increase in the exposure of the banking system to bond holdings
decreases credit flow by 3.1% of GDP, the net effect is 3.6%.6
Sovereign spreads and domestic debt. I find evidence that sovereign interest rate spreads
are negatively correlated with the amount of government debt held by domestic investors. In
particular, this relationship prevails if the amounts held by domestic banks are considered.
As debt sustainability depends on the default’s costs and assumes that the government can-
not discriminate across the debt holders, the debt structure between domestic and foreign in-
vestors could be considered in the cost of sovereign debt. Since defaulting to domestic debt
holders can be considered an ex-post cost, investors’ expected yield could decrease, as there is
a lower risk of default. However, as defaulting to foreign agents can be considered an ex-ante
benefit, investors’ expected yield could increase as the risk of default increases.
I tested whether the structure of bond holdings was important to explain the yields observed
in the data across emerging economies. I used data for sovereign spreads from JP-Morgan
Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) and for the structure of investors I follow Arslanalp and
Tsuda (2014) that estimated the amount of sovereign debt in the hands of foreign and domestic
holders.7 The data frequency is quarterly and comprise information from 2004 to 2016.
6The net decrease in private credit includes the marginal and direct effects of a default and the exposure of
the banking system.
7Foreign debt holders comprise three categories: banks, non-banks, official sources. Domestic holders are
comprised of banks, non-banks, and the central bank.
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First, I used the following pooled OLS regression to test whether sovereign yields are neg-
atively (positively) associated with the amount of debt held by domestic (foreign) investors






+ β3ŷi,t−1+X′i,t−1γ + νt + εi,t, (3.2)
where S i,t is the sovereign spread for a country i at time t,
BDi,t−1
yi,t−1
is the amount of debt-to-GDP
in the hands of domestic holders,
BFi,t−1
yi,t−1
is the amount of debt-to-GDP in the hands of foreign
holders, ŷi,t−1 is the country’s GDP gap i,the term αi controls for fix effects across countries, νt
captures elements of common time variation across countries, and X′i,t−1 is a vector of variables
controlling for global factors.
The coefficients of interest are β1, β2, and β3. For domestic and foreign debt holders, a
negative (positive) value on the associated coefficient β1 and β2, respectively, indicated that the
change sovereign risk premium, captured by the sovereign spread, decreases (increases) with
the number of bonds held by each type of holder. Finally, a negative value for β3 indicated that
sovereign risk decreased when the output gap was positive.
The results of the regression estimates (3.2) are presented in column 1 of Table (B.2). While
the estimate for β1 was significantly negative, the estimate for β2 was positive but not signifi-
cant. In addition, the GDP gap coefficient was negative but not significant.8
Second, I exploited the database details from Arslanalp and Tsuda (2014) that estimated
the amount of government debt held by different types of banking and non-banking investors.
I used these estimates to run an alternative version of regression (3.2) where I split the amount
of debt held by domestic and foreign holders. The following pooled OLS regression shows the
alternative version associating spreads with the residency of the debt holder












+ β3ŷi,t−1+X′i,t−1γ + νt + εi,t, (3.3)
where S i,t is the sovereign spread for a country i at time t, yi,t−1 is the country’s GDP gap in i,the
term αi controls for fix effects across countries, νt captures elements of common time variation








the amount of debt-to-GDP in the hands of domestic (foreign) holders of type D that can be
8While the coefficient was not statistically significant, this last result could hint that sovereign risk decreases
as economic conditions improve, as expected by the theory connecting default risk with income fluctuations.
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different sources: banking (b) and non-banking (n).
The results of the regression estimates (3.3) are presented in column 2 of Table (B.2). The
only stock of bonds that is statistically significant to explain the spread in the pooled regression
is βb < 0.
3.3 Model
Agents. There are four types of domestic agents in the economy (firms, households, and the
sovereign government) and one abroad (international investors). Firms operate a technology
transforming hired labor into a final consumption good. Households are inhabited by two
agents, workers, and bankers. There is full risk insurance across agents. Workers supply labor
and return their wages to the household. Each period, bankers use the household’s assets to in-
vest in company loans and government bonds and transfer the dividends back to the household.
State. There are two endogenous state variables in this economy, the stock of public debt
B and the stock of total domestic debt b, and one exogenous state variable, TFP shock z. Note
that the government decides to issue debt to international investors b?′ and domestic banks b′.
Moreover, the stock of government debt B′ is the sum of both types of debt. Therefore, the
problem remains the same, as the government chose the total stock of debt B′ and the stock
of domestic debt b′, where the foreign debt was computed by subtracting domestic debt from
total debt (b?′ = B′ − b′).9
Timing of events. At the beginning of the period, a Total Factor Productivity (TFP) shock
zt is realized, and the government decides whether to repay or default on domestic and foreign
debt. The timing is similar to Sosa-Padilla (2018). The top panel in fig:timeline represents
the timing after a repayment decision. After the government’s decision, firms decide their pro-
duction plan and demand banks loans to fill their working capital requirements. Bankers use
their endowment and the stock of debt repaid in the period in order to finance company loans.
Before the end of the period, loans are repaid, and the government issue one-period debt to in-
ternational investors and domestic banks. At the end of this period, households receive income
from bankers’ dividends, workers’ wages, and transfers from the government.
9Other studies analyzing the stock of foreign and domestic debt used the same strategy (Perez et al., 2015);
Balke et al. (2016)).
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In the case of default, the timeline of events proceeds as in the bottom panel of 3.1. After
a default, firms decide on a production plan that requires working capital. However, banks
can fund this requirement only through their endowment because they lose their accumulated
government bonds. Before the end of the period, the governments finish (continue) the finan-
cial autarky with the probability θ (1 − θ) and are able (not) to issue debt to foreign markets
and domestic banks. In newly accessing financial markets, they can issue debt to foreign and
domestic markets. At the end of the period, households consolidate the income of bankers and
workers and, in case of not being in financial autarky, receive transfers from the government.




Firms plan for production







Firms plan for production
Loans for working capital
Loans are repaid
θ: Governmen issue debt




The representative household has a continuum of members of measure unity. Within the house-
hold, there are 1 − f workers and f bankers. Workers supply labor nt to firms at wage rate wt
and return the payment wtnt to the household. Bankers operate as financial intermediaries, fa-
cilitating resources to firms and the government. Every period, bankers receive an endowment
A and bond holdings b from previous investments to provide loans to firms at the beginning of
the period and the government at the end of the period.
Within the household, there is perfect consumption insurance. Each period, identical house-
holds choose consumption ct, labor supply nt, and government bonds bt+1 to maximize dis-
counted lifetime utility. The preferences are time separable, and each period is discounted by
the factor β. The period utility function u(· ) considered preferences u(ct − g(nt)), where g(· )
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was the disutility to labor supply. In addition, in each period, households received an endow-
ment A that is used by bankers to start operations.
These households take as given the wage rate wt, profits from banks π
f
t , and transfers from











t = (1 + rt)(A + bt) − q(Bt+1, bt+1, zt)bt+1
where Tt denotes the government transfers, rt is the interest rate paid by intratemporal loans,
and q(Bt+1, bt+1, zt) is the international bond price.
Firms
Firms produce final goods with technology ztF(Nt) where they use labor Nt and face TFP shock
zt. Firms face working capital constraints to pay a share γ of the payroll in advance (before
production). Working capital requirements are financed through bank loans that are repaid at
the end of the period. The firms’ problem is:
max
N
ztF(Nt) − wtNt − rtγwtNt.
International investors
Competitive international investors are deep-pocket risk neutral. Investors buy one-period gov-
ernment bonds b∗ at cost q(Bt+1, bt+1, zt) and discount future payments at the international free
interest rate r?t .
Government
Each period, the government decides whether to default dt or repay (1− dt) on the public stock
of debt. In repayment, the government has access to international markets and can issue total
debt Bt+1 at cost q(Bt+1, bt+1, zt), it is divided between debt held by international investors b?t+1
and debt held by domestic bankers bt+1. In addition, the government has to repay one-period
10As is standard in quantitative models following Eaton-Gersovitz, households could not issue private debt
directly, but the government chose the optimal amount of debt and repayment decisions. As I describe later, funds
from borrowing are received in the form of transfers to households.
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government debt issued in the previous period Bt. The proceeds from repayments and issuing
new debt are transferred to the households
Tt = (1 − dt)(q(Bt+1, bt+1, zt)Bt+1 − Bt),
where Tt is the transfer received by households.
In the case of default, the government repudiates the total stock of debt Bt but cannot issue
new debt Bt+1. At the end of the period, the government can recover access to international
markets with probability (1 − θ) with zero debt to repay.
3.3.2 Recursive government problem
A government can solve the households’ problem by choosing to default d or repay (1 − d)
V(B, b, z) = max
d∈{0,1}
(1 − d)VR(B, b, z) + dVD(z) ,
where VD(z) is the value function for choosing to default and VR(B, b, z) is the value function
for choosing to repay.
In the case of repayment, the government maximizes the households’ lifetime utility by
choosing the optimal stock of total debt B′, the optimal amount of domestic debt b′, and labor
supply nt given the firms’ working capital constraints. The problem is represented by
VR(B, b, z) = max
c,n,l,b′,B′
u(c, n) + βE[V(B′, b′, z′)]
s.t.

















π f = (b + A)(1 + r) − q(B′, b′, z)b′,
where the first constraint represents government’s household transfers policy. The second
constraint combines labor supply. The third equation represents the households’ budget con-
straints. The fourth equation considers the equilibrium intra-period interest rate for working
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capital needs. The fifth constraint is the equilibrium wage rate for labor supply. Finally, the
last constraint represents the bank dividends paid to households.
The value of default is represented by
VD(z) = max
c,n,l,S


















π f = (A)(1 + r)
where the first equation represents the optimal conditions for labor supply within constrained
loans for working capital under default. The second equation introduces the feasibility con-
straint and does not consider government transfers. The third and fourth equations consider
the constrained equilibrium interest rate and wage rate, respectively. Finally, the last equation
introduces bank dividends in autarky.
As in Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012), the default policy can be characterized by a
default set in terms of
D(B′, b′) ={z ∈ [z, z] : VD(z) ≥ VR(B′, b′, z)},
where z and z represent the upper and lower bounds of TFP realizations. In addition, let the
complement of this set represent the repayment policy.
R(B, b) ={z ∈ [z, z] : VR(B′, b′, z) > VD(z)}.
In the case of repayment, the optimal new total debt issued by the government B′ and the
optimal debt issued to domestic banks b′ can be represented by rules mapping the current state
of tomorrow’s optimal borrowing
B′ =B̃(B, b, z)
b′ =b̃(B, b, z).
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Using these elements, and given that international investors are deep pocket risk-neutral and
operate in a competitive environment, the equilibrium cost function can be written as






Markov equilibrium.- The relevant state variables are B, b, and z, and in recursive Markov
equilibria, all decisions are functions of this state. A recursive equilibrium for this economy is
(i) a set of policy functions for consumption c̃(B, b, z), new issuances of total debt B̃(B, b, z),
new issuances of domestic debt b̃(B, b, z), repayment sets R(B, b), and default sets D(B, b), and
(ii) price functions for short-term debt, such that
1.- Taking as given the bond price function q(B′, b′, z), the policy functions c̃(B, b, z), B̃(B, b, z),
and b̃(B, b, z), repayment sets R(B, b), and default sets D(B, b) satisfy the borrower’s op-
timization problem.
2.- The bond price functions q(B′, b′, z) satisfy the bond price equilibrium equation.
Optimality conditions. I analyzed the optimality conditions of the government to illustrate
the benefits of issuing more debt domestically. As an illustration, I assumed that the distribu-
tion function f was continuous and that the bond cost schedule and value function were dif-
ferentiable. Therefore, the optimality first-order conditions of the government’s problem were
q(B′, b′, z), such that the following conditions hold











B′ : u′(c)q(B′, b′, z) = β
∫
R(BB′ ,b′)




This equation represents the optimality condition of accumulating debt held by domestic
bankers. The left hand side of the equation shows the households’ costs for accumulating
domestic assets, valued as foregone consumption in the present. The right hand side of the
equation represents the benefits of accumulating government debt in repayment states. The
first term shows that domestic bonds provide additional consumption and an additional source
of liquidity in the financial system, as bonds can be used for working capital loans. The second
term shows how domestic debt holdings affect the value of external debt issued in the present.
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As I demonstrate in the quantitative analysis, the bond price schedule increases with additional
domestic bonds, i.e., ∂q(B
′,b′,z)
∂b′ > 0, as the government has fewer incentives to default when debt
is held domestically and can trigger a decrease in working capital loans.
Equation (3.3.2) represents the optimality condition of issuing total government debt (com-
bining domestic and foreign assets). The term in the equation’s left side represents the increase
in consumption from borrowing today. The first term in the equation’s right side represents the
consumption foregone in future repayment states. The second term shows how debt issuance
affects the value of external debt issued in the present. In the quantitative section, I demon-
strate the term ∂q(B
′,b′,z)
∂B′ < 0. Intuitively, as total debt increases due to debt issuance to foreign
investors (holding domestic debt constant), there are more incentives to default.
3.4 Quantitative analysis
3.4.1 Computation
I solved the recursive equilibrium numerically with value function iteration around discretized
grids of total government assets, domestic assets, and an exogenous TFP shock. As in Hatchondo
et al. (2010), I solved the finite-horizon model with backward induction. I iterate the solution
over several periods such that in the last iteration, in transition from the second to the first pe-
riod, the difference of the value function and bond price of both periods was lower than 1e-6.
3.4.2 Calibration
The benchmark calibration was based on quarterly data from Argentina. The set of parameters
is described in 3.1.







where the labor share parameter in the benchmark calibration is α = 1.
The firm technology follows a decreasing return to scale technology:
F(N) = Nα
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Table 3.1: Parameters
Parameter Value Source
Risk aversion σ = 2 RBC literatue
Risk-free interest rate r? = 0.017% US
Curvature of labor disutility ω = 1.83% Frisch Labor elasticity
TFP process σz = 3.4%, ρz = 0.96 Argentina’s GDP
Reentry probability θ = 0.1 Tree-year exclusion
Share of the wage bill financed γ = 0.52 Argentina’s data
Discount factor β = 0.8 Default rate 3 %
Cost of issuing equity A = 0.356 Bank exposure 12 %
Firms’ Tecbnology α = 0.66
where the labor share parameter in the benchmark calibration is α = 0.66.
Productivity shock follows an AR(1) process:
logzt = ρzlogzt−1 + εt
with εt
iid
∼ N(0,σ2z ). The process was calibrated to the quarterly real GDP from Argentina’s Min-
istry of Economy and Finance (MECON) for the period 1980Q1–2005Q4. The productivity
process obtained features ρz=0.96 and σ2z = 3.4. The banks’ endowment A was calibrated to
maintain exposure of the balance sheet bA+b as 12%.
The parameter for the government discount factor βwas set at 0.80 in accordance with quar-
terly calibration used in other quantitative studies. I used the U.S. quarterly interest rate for the
risk-free interest rate. The working capital parameter was taken from Sosa-Padilla (2018) who
estimated that 0.3% of the wage bill is financed by working capital.
The probability value for re-entry to the financial markets after a default θ was set at 0.10,
consistent with exclusion of three years. This parameter was set following previous literature.
Other quantitative studies calibrated this parameter for a range from 2 to 6 years of exclusion,
consistent with empirical estimates across a sample of default episodes (Richmond and Dias,
2009; Gelos et al., 2011).11
11While Dias and Richmond (2009) provided estimates of the average (median) time of exclusion between 5.7
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3.4.3 Bond prices and policy functions
Figure 3.2: Price schedule
(a) Bond price to public debt (b) Bond price to domestic debt
Source: Author’s calculations. Panel (a) shows the price schedule with respect to total government’s debt at
different levels of the productivity shock. Each price schedule consider constant the level of debt held by domestic
banks. Panel (b) shows the price schedule with respect to debt issued domestic holders at different levels of the
productivity shock. Each price schedule consider constant the level of total government debt.
In this subsection, I examine the properties of the numerical solution of the calibrated
model. Figure 3.2 plots the bond price concerning public debt (B) for a fixed level domestic
debt (b).12 Panel (a) shows that the bond price schedule decreased for total government debt
(i.e. ∂q(B
′,b′,z)
∂B′ < 0). The dotted vertical line is fixed at the stock of domestic debt chosen by the
government. Therefore, the price schedule after this line represents the bond price schedule
associated with external debt. However, when the stock of public debt is entirely domestic, the
price of issuing bonds does not show any risk as it is costly to default on domestic households.
When the government starts to issue debt to international investors, issuing bonds reflects the
risk of default as the government can benefit from not repaying international investors. In the
panel (b) plots the price schedule of total government debt for a country with high and low
TFP shock in the current period. A good (bad) TFP shock improves (worsens) the bond price
(3) years, Gelos et al., 2011 found that on average, it took around 2–4.5 years to recover partial market access.
Quantitative studies analyzing sovereign default on external debt had targeted an average exclusion around 3-6
years (Arellano and Ramanarayanan, 2012; Cuadra et al., 2010; Mendoza and Yue, 2012). In studies considering
domestic defaults, the estimates vary between 1.25-4 years (Malucci, (2015); Sosa-Padilla, 2018; Perez et al.,
2015).
12Domestic debt was set at the simulated average debt.
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Figure 3.3: Price schedule
(a) Bond price to public debt (b) Bond price to domestic debt
Source: Author’s calculations. Panel (a) shows the price schedule with respect to total government’s debt at
different levels of the productivity shock. Each price schedule consider constant the level of debt held by domestic
banks. Panel (b) shows the price schedule with respect to debt issued domestic holders at different levels of the
productivity shock. Each price schedule consider constant the level of total government debt.
schedule.
Figure 4.1 shows the bond price concerning domestic debt for a fixed level of total gov-
ernment debt.13 Panel (a) shows that bond price increased as domestic debt increased (i.e.
∂q(B′,b′,z)
∂b′ > 0). When government debt is issued to domestic holders, a non-discriminatory de-
fault becomes costly. Panel (b) plots the price schedule of domestic debt for a country with
high and low TFP shock in the current period. A good (bad) TFP shock improves (worsens)
the bond price schedule.
I simulated the numerical solution of the model to analyze the model economy’s stationary
distribution. I conducted 1,000 simulations with 10,000 periods in each simulation. I then
extracted the last 500 observations of each simulation. Finally, I logged and HP filtered the
simulated series. The stationary distributions were averages over simulated variables.
Data. The data used to compare the model is from different sources. Output, consumption,
and trade balance were seasonally adjusted from 1980-Q1 to 2005-Q4 with data from MECON.
The bond spread data is from J.P. Morgan’s Emerging Markets Bond Indices (EMBI) for Ar-
gentina from 1994Q1 to 2002Q1. Following the strategy of Sosa-Padilla (2018), I computed
the average total debt to GDP, domestic to GDP debt, and external debt from Reinhart and Ro-
13Total government debt was set at the simulated average debt.
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Table 3.2: Data and Moments
Non-Target Statistics Data Benchmark Risk Premia
Consumption std./Output std. ratio 1.03 1.01 1.023
Bond spreads std. 2.47 1.58 2.66
Average bond spread 6.21 1.24 5.12
Correlation with Output:
Labor 0.96 0.93 0.91
Correlation with Bond spreads:
Output -.52 -0.36 -0.12
Labor -0.45 -0.35 -0.10
Debt statistics:
Total Debt/GDP (%) 41.30 62.71 12.82
Domestic debt/GDP (%) 11.32 20.10 4.22
External debt/GDP (%) 29.98 42.61 6.60
Target statistics
Default frequency 3 2.98 2.98
Average exposure(%) 12 12 12
The table reports the statistics for Argentina observed in the data and reproduced by
the model. All variables are logged and then de-trended using the Hodrick-Prescott
filter, with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
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goff (2011). I did not measure the average exposure for Argentina, but I used the mean cross-
country banks’ exposure to government debt constructed as in Kumhof and Tanner (2005).14
Benchmark model. The second column of 3.2 shows the long-run moments for the bench-
mark calibration. The model reproduces that around 42 % of total debt is held by domestic
banks compared with 37 % in the data. However, in this model, total debt sustainability was
higher than in the data. The domestic debt is higher than what we observe in data which im-
plies an important motive to use it. In addition, external debt was higher, supporting the idea
that higher domestic debt can improve repayment credibility and increase external debt.
The excess volatility of consumption to output was slightly lower than in data. In this
model, the endogenous cost of default and the high persistence of TFP shock imply that good
(bad) states prevail in the future. In addition, the bond price schedule improved (worsened)
in good (bad) states. Therefore, given the high discounting implies a desire for consumption
smoothing, the government borrowed to front-load consumption in good times. However, in
bad states, the government decreased its consumption as borrowing became costly. Nonethe-
less, the existence of domestic debt introduced a counterbalance as it improved borrowing
conditions. In turn, this last effect could be behind the limited excess of volatility with respect
to the data.
Expected sovereign spreads were positive but not close to those observed in the data. In
addition, the spreads’ volatility was below that observed in the data. The possibility of issuing
domestic debt decreased the probability of default. Therefore, conditional on observing pos-
itive domestic debt, the bond price schedule for total debt payment improves compared to a
situation with no domestic debt. This effect could also influence the expected spread volatility.
The model also reproduced a negative correlation between spread concerning labor supply
and output. A bad shock increased the spread, and given its persistence, it became costlier to
issue any debt in future periods. As it became costlier for the government to issue domestic
debt for liquidity purposes, domestic bonds decreased, and its availability to provide working
capital negatively impacted labor and output.
Risk premia. In the benchmark calibration there is low level of the sovereign spread con-
trasting with ability of the model to reproduce the structure of foreign to domestic debt. A
14In the case of Argentina, anecdotal evidence from Mishkin (2006) mentioned that banks’ exposure were
10%, increasing to 25% before the 2001 default.
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common concern is that risk premia can be an important driver of sovereign spreads (Longstaff
et al. (2011); Borri and Verdelhan (2009)). Therefore, once it is considered, the ability of the
model to reproduce the share of domestic to total debt can disappear. In this section, I introduce
a risk premia to the model, to evaluate the how it affects the role of domestic debt.
Several studies involving quantitative models of sovereign default introduced risk premia
through a pricing kernel M(z′, z). I followed the specification and parametrization of Arellano
and Ramanarayanan (2012). In this specification the price of government debt is:
q(B′, b′, z) =
∫
R(B′,b′)
M(z′, z) f (z′, z)dz′. (3.4)
I considered a pricing kernel where foreign investors’ marginal utility increased where the
probability of repayment was low. As explained in Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012), this
negative covariation was costed in the asset and required a lower price (higher premium). I
modified the model and introduced the price in (3.4). The model was then re-calibrated for
those parameters, targeting the average exposure and default frequency.
The variation of the model of time-varying risk premia through a pricing kernel for inter-
national investors. Following Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012), the pricing kernel specifi-
cation took the form




where γt = α0 + α1logzt, r? is the risk-free interest rate, εt+1 = logzt+1 − ρzlogzt. The parameter
γt represents the market price of risk. A high enough α0 > 0 can impose γt > 0 on average.
Moreover, α1 < 0 imposes higher risk premium when the economy faces low TFP shock. I
used the parameterization in Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012), α0 = 11 and α1 = −141.15
The third column of shows the moments for the modified version with a risk premium.
While the moment matched several business cycle statistics, it had problems reproducing the
negative relationship between bond spreads, output, and labor. More importantly, in this econ-
omy, the government decreased its total debt, unsurprisingly, as shocks to risk premium caused
the worst conditions for borrowing.16 However, the relative importance of domestic debt re-
mained, as almost 33% of debt was domestic with respect to 27 % in the data. Again, this
15While Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012) pinned down α0 and alpha1 from Longstaff et al. (2011) for esti-
mates of Brazil’s pricing kernel, I used the same parametrization for Argentina, as it shares several characteristics
with Brazil. In addition, this has been repeated in other studies Lopez-Martin et al. (2017).
16The low level of indebtedness was also found in Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012)
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shows that domestic debt is still an asset that governments use for future liquidity.
Sovereign spreads and bondholdings. In the empirical section, I showed that in the data
there is a negative relationship between the sovereign spread and the stock of debt-to-GDP
held by domestic banks. This property can be reproduced in the model by varying the banks’
balance sheet. By varying the parameter A, I can solve the model over a grid of exposure of
banks to government bonds b
′
A+b′ . As shown before, this statistic dominates the preference of
the government to issue debt to domestic markets. As can be observed in Figure 3.4 this rela-
tionship is negative as in the data.17
Figure 3.4: Spreads and domestic debt
Source: Author’s calculations. This plot shows the model recalibrated to match different levels of domestic
debt-to-GDP. The vertical axis shows the spread for each level of domestic debt.
3.5 Conclusions
I this paper, I showed empirical evidence about the relationship between sovereign debt and
banks. First, I showed that banks’ balance sheets are highly exposed to sovereign debt. Sec-
ond, credit decrease in episodes of default and this cost increase with exposure of the banking
system. Third, government spreads for default are negatively correlated with bondholdings.
The empirical evidence suggest that while banks’ bond exposure is costly in case of a default,
17This exercise involved solving the model to match an equidistant grid of domestic debt-to-GDP
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the exposure increase the probability of repayment ex-ante.The first two empirical facts sug-
gest that sovereign default are costly in terms of its effect on bank’s balance sheets. The third
empirical fact suggest that the sovereign risk decrease with the stock of debt held by banks.
I propose a quantitative model of sovereign default with domestic banks and international
investors. In this setup, the government can internalize the effect that issuing domestic debt
in bond prices. This effect allows the government to issue more external debt at better price.
I calibrated and solved the model using for an emerging economy. I found that the model
replicated the untargeted structure of domestic to foreign debt observed in the data. The model
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Chapter 4
Real Exchange Rate devaluations, exports
dynamics and global firms
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I study the reasons why exports do not increase after a real exchange rate de-
valuation. I develop a quantitative model according to which sunk costs affect firms’ decisions
to become exporters. In addition, exporters are also intensive importers, as they must finance
a share of their costs with external goods. The reaction of exports to a devaluation may be
dampened for two reasons. First, sunk costs reduce the willingness of firms to operate abroad.
Second, as exporters are intensive importers, their costs increase substantially upon a devalua-
tion. I solve the model and simulate the real exchange devaluation in Colombia during 2014.
Further, I demonstrate that, with these two elements, the model can reproduce the staggered
reaction of exports.
Colombia suffered a RER devaluation in the third quarter of 2014, and the elasticity of
exports to RER remained staggered for at least five quarters after the devaluation. Simultane-
ously, there was sharp increase in the cost of foreign borrowing as the US began to increase its
interest rates. A particular element of the Colombian economy is that its exporters are global
firms. That is, firms that are also intensive importers account for 90 % of the total exports, see
Sandoval-Hernandez (2021).
In this study, I build a small open economy (SOE) model considering exporting firms that
can incorporate both types of shock. In the model, there is a continuum of firms that, for each
period, determines whether it is optimal to export to the rest of the world. Incumbent and new
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exporters face a sunk cost to sell products abroad. To capture the idea of exporters being global
firms, I allow that a share of the costs must be imported. Each incumbent (new) exporter de-
cides whether to remain (participate) in international markets by evaluating the future stream
of net profits vis-à-vis not participating.
During a devaluation, the future stream of profits for an exporter increases. Hence, there is
a potential increase in the measure of exporters. However, export costs operate as a friction for
the devaluation to allow for an increase of the extensive margin. Further, as a share of these
costs must be financed with imports, the incentives to become an exporter decrease.
Related literature. This paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, it con-
siders a strand of the literature that studying the dynamics of exports to large devaluations and
changes in trade barriers (see Alessandria et al., 2013; Alessandria and Choi, 2007; and Lopez-
Martin et al., 2019). In this study, I extend the work of Alessandria et al. (2013) and introduce
firms that are also intensive importers. This feature is particular of the structure of Colombia
as shown by (Sandoval-Hernandez, 2021) as an important share of exporters are global firms.
I show that this feature is important to reproduce the staggered reaction of exports.
My work is in the line of Blaum et al. (2018). By using data from Mexico at the firm level,
this paper finds that an important share of exporters are also importers. Sandoval-Hernandez
(2021) showed that this characteristic is also found in Colombia. Furthermore, Roberts and
Tybout (1997) shows empirically that sunk costs are important to explain Colombia’s exporter
entry decisions. Combining both parts of the literature, I introduce this feature in a stylized
aggregate model as a requirement to pay a share of the sunk costs with imports. Sunk costs
paid in terms of imports had been also introduced in the lines of Lopez-Martin et al. (2019).
The SOE economy developed in this chapter is in the lines of standard real business cycle
models (see Mendoza, 1991; Garcia-Cicco et al., 2010; and Neumeyer and Perri, 2005). In the
model, the external real interest rate plays an important role as it affects the returns of being an
exporter in the next period. Alessandria et al. (2013) showed that during large devaluations the
real interest rate increases sharply. This feature is present also in the devaluation in Colombia
in 2014. Therefore, by rising the international interest rate, the future benefits of being an ex-
porter decrease during a devaluation. Also, I extend the standard international RBC model by
introducing a global demand for exports which is a function of the extensive margin.
Layout This chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, I present the model and the equi-
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librium of the economy. In section 3, I discuss the parametrization of the model. In section 4, I
present the quantitative results related to the simulation of the devaluation event, and in section
5, I discuss concluding remarks.
4.2 Model
4.2.1 Households
There is a continuum of identical households. The households value consumption C and dislike
labor L according to the utility function u(C, L) and discount the future witht discount factor β.
Also, the households can save through one-period bonds that pay an interest rate of R at period
t + 1. Labor is supplied to good firms in exchange for a wage rate of w. The households are the
owners of the exporting firms. Therefore, I denote Π are the net dividends that the households
receive from their shares in exporting firms. Households make plans for consumption, labor








PtCt + Bt+1 = wtLt + Πt + Bt(1 + Rt).
In this setup, I assume that the households’ utility function can be represented with Green-




where σ represents the coefficient of risk aversion, the parameter η controls the curvature of
the labor disutility and λ sets the intensity for labor disutility. Also, we consider that interest
rates from international markets can be represented by
Rt+1 = ρRRt + εRt+1 ε
R
t+1 ∼ N(0, 1).
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where Uc,t represents the marginal utility for consumption and UL,t the marginal utility for
labor.
4.2.2 Domestic Market: local producers and importers
Final goods. The final goods consumed by households Ct are produced by combining inter-
mediate input from domestic producers yd and from imports ymt from the rest of the world. This












with the elasticity of substitution across home and foreign imports γ and bias for foreign input
φ. The problem of a final good producer is to minimize its expenditure on intermediate inputs















t ) ≥ 1
where pmt and p
d
t are cost of imports and domestic intermediate goods, respectively. From the

























where ldt is labor hired in the home country and zt is a technology shock that follows the process
zt+1 = ρzt + εt+1 εt+1 ∼ N(0, 1).
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We assume that the market is competitive, therefore, the price of the intermediate goods are
equal to the wage rate
pdt = wt.
4.2.4 Foreign Market: Exporters decisions
Exporting decision. In this economy, the number of exporters comes from two types of firms:
old exporters (ox) and new exporters (nx). While old exporters are firms that participated dur-
ing the period t − 1 selling their products abroad, new exporters face the decision to export
without any participation in the previous period. Therefore, at period t, old exporters obtain
profits π from previous operations but new exporters will obtain profits until the next period.
We assume that each type of firm faces operating costs as an exporter. Old exporters must
pay continuation costs κox to remain operating but they avoid such costs in case they leave the
exporting sector. New exporters must pay fixed costs κx to start operations in foreign markets.
The cost κi for each type of exporter i ∈ {ox, nx} are identically independently distributed with
an accumulated probability function Fi(κi). A share δ of these costs has to be bought in the do-
mestic market and a share (1 − δ) has to be part of the imports. Finally, units of labor required
are rationalized to meet those costs.
The dynamic problem exporting decision for each type of firm is described below. Old
exporters have to decide whether to remain operating at cost δwκoxz + (1 − δ)pmκx or take their
profits and become a non-exporter

















In the case of a non-exporter considering operating abroad, they have to decide whether it is
worthwhile paying the fixed costs and obtaining a discounted future stream of profits, or to
remain as a non-exporting firm

















In both problems Vox denotes the value of being an old exporter and Vnx is the value of being a
new exporter.
The decision to remain as an exporter, or to become a new exporter, is determined by both
the continuation and fixed costs. In particular, exporters willing to remain participating in the
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international markets or to become new exporters, are those whose costs are lower than the








Vx(κ′,R′, z′) − Vnx(κ′,R′, z′)
1 + R′
]
for i ∈ {ox, nx}.
From these expressions we can observe there is a cost κ̄ = κ̄nx = κ̄ox that characterizes the
marginal exporter willing to participate in international markets. Therefore, the distribution of
the costs Fi(κ) ∈ {ox, nx} determines the amount of exporters in the period t + 1.
Formally, the number of firms willing to export in the next period Nt+1 is determined by
the amount of old exporters remaining Fox(κ)Nt and the amount of non-exporters that find it
profitable to enter into international markets Fnx(κ)[1 − Nt]. The laws of motion for exporters
can be determined as
Nt+1 = Fox(κ)Nt + Fnx(κ)[1 − Nt]
4.2.5 Demand for exports
We assume the rest of the world produces final goods by using intermediate goods from their
own region y?i and from abroad, i.e. Colombia, yi. We denote θ as the constant elasticity of
substitution of varieties coming from the same region. Also, we denote γ as the constant elas-
ticity of substitution across intermediate goods coming from different regions. The production


























We assume final goods markets is competitive. Therefore the final good producer’s problem is









































Where P? is the final good price index, p? is a price index of the goods produced in the rest of
the world and p is a price index of the goods imported from home.1
In this setup, we combine the definition of the price indexes to express the individual de-
mand for Colombian intermediate goods as




In addition, we assume that there is no heterogeneity in the production therefore the price index













The problem for firms i exporting, is maximizing their profits πi considering they have mar-
ket power to set their price pxi and that they can hire labor from the domestic market. We



































1See the appendix to follow the derivation of the demand functions and price indexes.
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4.2.7 A competitive equilibrium













t } are such that:
• Given (Pt,wt,Rt), allocations (Ct, Lt, Bt+1) solves the households’ problem.
• Given (pdt , p
m




t ) solves the final goods producers problem.
• Given (pxt , P
?




t ,Πt) solves the exporting firms’ problem.
• Allocations solve the exporting firms’ problem.
• Satisfy market clearing conditions for labor, exports and aggregate resource constraintA
full stop is needed at the end of the equations.





















ptXt − pmt Mt = Bt + (1 + Rt+1)Bt+1
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4.3 Parametrization
Event study I study the event of the real exchange rate (RER) devaluation that occurred in
Colombia in the third quarter of 2014. I focused on the dynamics of the RER up to four years
after the devaluation started. The RER devaluated almost to 40 % and the international interest
rate increased in almost 50 basis points. This event can be explained by international conditions
the economy confronted at the time. On the one hand, there was drop in the price of oil that
is an important commodity for Colombia. On the other hand, emerging economies struggled
with the increase of interest rates in the United States (US).
Solution method I focus on the aggregate consequences of the devaluation in the dynamics
of the exporting sector. I solved the model using local perturbation methods and then proceeded
in two steps to evaluate the aggregate dynamics around a devaluation. First, I found a sequence
of shocks to TFP {εz} and international interest rates {εR} in order to replicate the path of the




and international interest rates Rt. Second, given the shocks replicating
the devaluation episodes, I replicated the dynamics of the remaining endogenous variables of
the model.2
Calibration. In this section, I discussed the strategy for the parametrization of the model.
One set of parameters was taken from the quantitative macroeconomic literature. The other set
of parameters were calibrated to match the value of endogenous variables in the steady state of
the model. The model was solved using perturbation methods and it is simulated on a quarterly
basis. Table 4.1 summarizes the parametrization of the model. The solution of the equilibrium
of the model in a steady state is shown in the appendix.
The parameter for risk aversion was set σ at 2. The parameter η controls the curvature
of the labor disutility and was set at 1.5, which is consistent with the Frisch wage elasticity
of the labor supply of 1
η
= 2. The parameter that controls the elasticity of substitution across
intermediate goods γ was set at 1.5. The ratio of profits to payroll was set at 1.25.3
Most of the parameters obtained from data were set to attain the equilibrium in the steady
state. I set the parameters for the share of firms exporting as Nss = 0.40 and the exit rate of
2This procedure relies on the state space representation of the model’s solution given a first order approxima-
tion.
3This parameter is used to solve the steady state. The steady state is not sensitive to this parameter in values
from around one to three.




CRRA preferences σ = 2 Macroeconomic Literature
Curvature of labor disutility η = 1.5 Frisch Labor elasticity of 2
Elasticity of Substituttion accross exports θz = 3 Markup of 50%
Debt to Imports in steatdy state BssMss = 3 Average Debt to Imports 1980-2014
Elasticity of substitution across intermediate inputs γ = 1.5
Targeted moments
Parameter Value Target





Labor disutility intensity λ = 3.201 Hours worked L = 13
Adjustment in the cumulative prob. no ψox = 2.681 Stock of exporters N ss = 0.25
Adjustment in the cumulative prob. nx ψnx = 0.10 Exit rate 1 − Fnx(κss) = 0.015




Probability function parameter ν = 0.07 Average exports after depreciation
Share of costs bought abroad δ = 0.4 Average imports after a depreciation
new exporters at 1.5 %.4 I set a functional form for the probability distribution of the sunk and








with ψ ∈ {ox, nx}.5 In the calibration, the parameter ψox will allow me to target Nss and the
parameter ψnx will allow me to target the exit rate 1−F(κss). The parameter ν controlled the av-
erage response of exports after the devaluation episode. The intensity of sunk costs δ financed
with foreign goods is set at 0.4 in order target a level of imports after a depreciation.
The targeted relative price of exports to domestic goods pxpd was set at 0.55 according to the
relative production price index of the US to the consumer price index in Colombia. By setting
this relative price, the model determines the curvature in the production of exporting goods α.
4I use the database from (Sandoval-Hernandez, 2021) to compute those statistics.
5Alessandria et al. (2013) use a similar probability function which is helpful to make the model parsimonious.
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The parameter φ controls the ratio of labor used in exports with respect to domestic and was set
at 10%. λ was set to adjust the labor supply to be consistent with 1/3. Finally, the ratio of debt
to imports was set at 3.5% consistent with the data of Colombia in the period of 1980–2014.
4.4 Results
Figure 4.1 shows the dynamics of the RER and elasticity of exports to RER in Colombia in the
third quarter of 2014. Panel (a) shows the depreciation of the RER. In this case, we use shocks
that replicates exactly the dynamics of the model. Hence, the model and the data show does not
differ. Panel (b) shows the elasticity of exports to a devaluation in the RER. This plot contrasts
the model with the data. The data shows a sluggish increase in the elasticity of exports, as it
takes several years to become positive. The model can recover this feature. The model makes
a good fit because we consider that exporters require a share of imports to start operations.
The beginning of the devaluation shows exporters require imports to operate, making it costly.
Consequently, exports do not react in the first quarter. However, as the devaluation is stronger,
future profits overcome the cost of imports.6
There are three channels operating for the staggered reaction of exports. First, the direct
effect of sunk costs dominates the entry decision of exporters. It makes them avoid the entry
to international market. Second, as a share of the sunk costs have to be paid as international
goods, the devaluation increases the cost of being exporter. Third, future profits are discounted
highly given the increase in the exchange rate. All these effects starts to disappear once the
RER rebounds.
6This feature is particular of the Colombian exporting sector as 90% of the exports are produced by firms that
are also intensive importers.
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(b) Elasticity of exports to RER
Source: Author’s calculations.
4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, I studied the role of entry costs in exporting decisions to explain the sluggish
reaction of the exports after a large devaluation. I developed a SOE quantitative model with
sunk cost for the continuation (entry) decisions of incumbent (new) exporters. Exporters are
active importers as a share of those costs must be financed with imports from the rest of the
world.
In the model developed in this chapter, during a large devaluation the future profits of a
firm willing to export increase. However, the incumbent (new) exporter must pay an entry cost
to operate abroad. In addition, a share of those entry cost must be imported as we consider that
exporters are global firms (ie. intensive importers). This requirement decreases the benefits to
become exporter. I calibrated the model to match the average extensive margin in normal times
and the exit rate of exporters. Upon a devaluation the frictions over the extensive explains the
sluggish reaction of the elasticity of exports to RER. I replicated a devaluation event in the
third quarter of Colombia in 2014. I obtained the sequence of shocks in TFP and interest rate
that replicates a RER devaluation. I compute the dynamics of the elasticity of exports to RER
over five years with respect to the observed with the data. The model is able to reproduce the
staggered response of the elasticity of exports with respect to RER.
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Appendix A
Appendix for chapter 2
A.1 Domestic banks’ balance sheet exposure to sovereign debt
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(b) Average country-year bank’s bondholding.
Source: International Financial Statistics and author’s calculations. The figure plots the banking system bond-
holdings over 2001–2016 for all country-years covered by both as weighted by GDP.
A.2 Defaults events
Default events. Albania(1991), Argentina (1989,2001), Armenia (1994), Azerbaijan(1994),
Bolivia 1986, Brazil (1990), Cameroon (1985), Costa Rica (1984), Ghana 1979, Jordan 1989,
Panama (1987), Peru (1983), Russia (1998), Turkey (1982), Ukraine (1998).
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A.3 Proof proposition 1
Proof proposition 1 First, rewrite the banker problem in recursive form. The banker problem






i−t{(1 − ψ)ni+1 + ψπbi+1}
s.t.
qi+1bi+1 + ki+1 =
di+1
ri
+ ni − πbi )
di+1 = λni
ni+1 = bi+1 + Ri+1ki+1 − di+1.
In this case the objective function of the bankers’ problem can be written as
Vbt = maxbi+1,ki+1,di+1




i−t{(1 − ψ)ni+1 + ψπbi+1}
}
Vbt = maxbi+1,ki+1,di+1
EΛt,t+1{(1 − ψ)nt+1 + ψπbt+1 + ψV
b
t+1}
In this problem a banker that remain in such activities has no incentives to provide dividends
to its household πbt+1 = 0 as it can save that amount and decrease the need for external deposits
in the future. Now, rewriting the problem the sequential problem a recursive problem. Let
the state to be represented as S = (b, k, d, z) and the banker’s net worth with n. The Bankers’
dynamic problem can be written as:
v(n,S) = max
b′,k′,d′
EΛ(S,S′){(1 − ψ)n′ + ψv(n′,S′)}
s.t.





n′ = (1 − D(b′, k′, d′, z′))b′ + Rk′ − d′.
Second, I guess that the banker value function is linear in n and derive the bond price in equi-
librium. Assume that the value function is linear v(n,S) = α(S)n where α(S′) is the marginal
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n′ = (1 − D(b′, k′, d′, z′))b′ + Rk′ − d′.




n − qb′ and









+ b′ − λn (A.1)
which an expression on bonds and current net worth, by introducing this expression on the















where the adjusted discounted factor is Λ̂(S,S′) = EΛ(S,S′)[ψ + (1 − ψ)α(S′)]. From the first
order conditions we obtain that
q(S′) =
E[Λ̂(S,S′) [1 − D(b′, k′, d′, z′)]
E[Λ̂(S,S′)R(S′)]
.
In the paper we will let the bond price to be expressed as
q(b′, k′, d′, z′) =
E[Λ̂(b′, k′, d′, z′) [1 − D(b′, k′, d′, z′)]
E[Λ̂(b′, k′, d′, z′)R(b′, k′, d′, z′)]
.
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A.4 Numerical solution
Setup in order to solve the model. Grids [zi×bi×ki×di], where capital and deposits are around
their ki ∈ [0.5kss, 1.5kss] and di ∈ [0.5dss, 1.5dss]. The grid for (ki, di) grids are equally spaced
at 25 points. The productivity shock is around a grid of 40 points. The grid for bonds is bi grid
is set at 100 points. The model is parellalized with MPI at 20 cores in Fortran.
0.- Solve for period T considering terminal conditions for value functions and bond price.
1.- For a given state [zi × bi × ki × di] solve for (d′i , k
′
i ) the system of equations (bankers
balance sheet and aggregate resource constraint) such that (d′i , k
′
i ) solves
1.1.- In case of repayment, set the state [zi × bi × ki × di] × [b′i × z
′





system of equations (bankers balance sheet and aggregate resource constraint) such
that (d′, k′) solves
0 = f R(k′, d′)




i ) the system




0 = f NR(k′, d′)
2.- For a given state [zi × bi × ki × di],
2.1.- In case of repayment, set the state [zi × bi × ki × di] × [b′i × z
′
i] and use piecewise
cubic splines to interpolate the value functions at T over the solution (d′, k′) to
obtain value functions VT (bi, k′, d′, zi).
2.2.- In case of default, set the state [zi × bi × ki × di] × [z′i] and use piecewise cubic
splines to interpolate the value functions at T over the solution (d′, k′) to obtain
value functions VNRT (k
′, d′, zi).
3.- Compute the expected values of the value functions at T with Tauchen quadrature.
3.1.- In case of repayment, set the state [zi × bi × ki × di]× [b′i × z
′
i × k
′ × d′] and compute
EVRT (b′i , d′i , k′i , z′)
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3.2.- In case of default, set the state [zi × bi × ki × di] × [z′i × k
′ × d′] and compute
EVNRT (d′i , k′i , z′)
4.- Given [zi × bi × ki × di], solve for Value functions in T − 1
4.1.1- In repayment, for each (b′i) we have the optimal policy k
′, d′ and the expected
value function EVR(b′i , k′, d′, z′), therefore we can compute VRT−1(bi, ki, di, zi)
from:
VR(b, k, d, z) = max
c,k′,b′,d′,l
{u(c, l) + βE[V(b′, k′, d′, z′)]}
s.t.
zF(k, l) =c + k′ + (1 − δ)k − Ψ(k′, k)










k′ + qb′ =d + N
N =ψ(Rk + b − d) − (1 − ψ)n̄
Evaluate the optimal VR(b, k, d, z) by evaluating each (b′i).
4.1.2-4.2. In default, we have the optimal policy k′, d′ and the expected value function EVR(b′i , k′, d′, z′)
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and EVNR(b′i , k′, d′, z′), therefore we can compute VNRT−1(bi, ki, di, zi) from:
VNR(b, k, d, z) = max
c,k′,d′,l
{
u(c, l) + βE[NR(b′, k′, d′, z′) + (1 − θ)VR(b′, k′, d′, z′)]
}
s.t.
zF(k, l) =c + k′ + (1 − δ)k − Ψ(k′, k)










k′ =d + N
N =ψ(Rk − d) − (1 − ψ)n̄,
5.- Compute the bond price qT−1(bi, ki, di, zi)
6.- Repeat 2 to 5 for T large enough value functions and bond price converge.
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Appendix for chapter 3
B.1 Figures
Figure B.1: Domestic debt
(a) Share of debt held by domestic agents from
total debt.
(b) Share of debt held by domestic banks from
total debt held by domestic holder.
Source: Author’s calculations. Panel (a) shows the average share of debt held by domestic agents. Panel (b)
shows the average share of domestic debt held by banks. The average takes country-year observations for a set of
countries from 2001 to 2016. The red line shows the average share across countries.
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Figure B.2: Domestic bank’s bondholdings
(a) Average bank’s bondholdings by country. (b) Average country-year bank’s bondholding.
Source: International Financial Statistics and author’s calculations. The figure plots the banking system bond-
holdings over 2001–2016 for all country-years covered by both as weighted by GDP.
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Figure B.3: Bank’s sovereign exposure to assets
(a) Sovereign bond holdings to assets, 2014. (b) Sovereign bond holdings to assets, 2016.
(c) Sovereign bond holdings to assets, 2014. (d) Sovereign bond holdings to assets, 2016.
Source: European Banking Authority and author’s calculations. Panel (a) and (b) plots the aggregate sovereign
exposure to different measures of bank’s balance sheet. Panel (c) and (d) reproduce an scatter plot comparing the
balance sheet exposure using different definitions of the balance sheet. Notice that measures around the 45 show
that the effect of balance sheet in sovereign exposure is not important. Fully loaded assets refers to assets without
using any measure of risk on bank’s balance sheet. Risk-weighted assets refers to assets without using regulatory
risk weights on bank’s balance sheet.
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Figure B.4: Flow of credit
(a) Flow of credit conditional on the event.
(b) Flow of credit during a default conditional
on the level of bond holdings.
Source: International Financial Statistics and author’s calculations. Panel (a) shows the average change in credit
flow during years where default or no default where observed. Panel (b) compares the credit flow for countries
with bondholdings above and below the median. The average takes country-year observations for a set of countries
from 1980 to 2005.
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B.2 Tables
Table B.1: Private credit flow in a sovereign default episode
(1) (2)





Banking Crisist−1 -0.00664 -0.00700
(0.575) (0.589)
















The table reports the coefficients from OLS panel regressions of the differ-
ent variables on the private credit flow to GDP. The analysis cover a set of
countries advanced and emerging countries over the 1980 to 2005 period.
The standard errors are clustered at the country level. The ***, **, and *
denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively.
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Table B.2: Average share of the balance sheet held in bonds (2004-2017)
(1) (2)
spreads spreads
Bond holdings foreign 0.00745
(0.469)
Bond holdings foreign nonbanks 0.0354
(0.191)
Bond holdings foreign banks -0.0214
(0.108)
Bond holdings domestic -0.0432***
(0.001)
Bond holdings domestic nonbanks -0.0214
(0.108)
Bond holdings domestic banks -0.0828***
(0.007)








]The table reports the coefficients from OLS panel regressions of the amount
of debt held by different types of investors, output, global risk aversion (VIX),
and Fed fund rate on the change in the spreads. The analysis cover quarterly
data for a set of emerging countries from 2004 to 2016 period. The standard
errors are clustered at the country level. The ***, **, and * denote significance
at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively.
Appendix C
Appendix for chapter 4
C.1 Global demand for exports from home
In this section we develop the demand for exports from the rest of the world and price indexes


































































)− 1θ − pi = 0












































and the price index for goods imported from the home country p ≡
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Demand for intermediate goods. Replacing these expression in the first order conditions, we









Price indexes for final goods. The price index for the final goods P? can be derived from the






















































Demand for exports from home. In this section, we assume that exporting firms are homoge-
neous and set the same price in international markets, that is pi = px. Therefore the price index
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1−θ ( p̄x)−γ y?
where p̄x represents the terms of trade between the home country and the rest of the world.
C.2 Steady state solution
1.- We set the share of the exporting sector as N̄ss and the probability for the cost of contin-





where F0,ss is the probability for the sunk cost of new exporters in steady state. Using the
value for F0,ss, we let the the cost of the marginal exporter to be according this probability
κss = ν f0(F0,ss)ν−1.
therefore, κss is a parameter that must me adjusted to attain the target for N̄ss. In turn,

























2.- We target the mark-up of the exporting firms πsswsslx,ss and find f0 that allows the equilib-
rium in steady state to hold. First, notice that we can find an expression for πsswsslx,ss as
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and from the labor maket clearing condition we can find an expression for labor supply
in the exporting sector






where LR ≡ Nlx,ssld+Nlx,ss . By combining both expressions, we can set a function where the
marginal cost depends of κss. Recall from previous step that κ depends on f0, therefore




∣∣∣∣∣∣ πsswsslss ( f0) − πsswsslx,ss
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .




































































5.- By using the targeted ratio BssMss we solve for domestic goods Dss, imports Mss, exports
Xss, and debt Bss. We set pmss = 1 and the solution of the equilibrium is described as
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